• World
    • Africa
    • Asia Pacific
    • Central & South Asia
    • Europe
    • Latin America & Caribbean
    • Middle East & North Africa
    • North America
  • Coronavirus
  • Politics
    • US Election
    • US politics
    • Donald Trump
    • Brexit
    • European Union
    • India
    • Arab world
  • Economics
    • Finance
    • Eurozone
    • International Trade
  • Business
    • Entrepreneurship
    • Startups
    • Technology
  • Culture
    • Entertainment
    • Music
    • Film
    • Books
    • Travel
  • Environment
    • Climate change
    • Smart cities
    • Green Economy
  • Global Change
    • Education
    • Refugee Crisis
    • International Aid
    • Human Rights
  • International Security
    • ISIS
    • War on Terror
    • North Korea
    • Nuclear Weapons
  • Science
    • Health
  • 360 °
  • The Interview
  • In-Depth
  • Insight
  • Quick Read
  • Video
  • Podcasts
  • Interactive
  • My Voice
  • About
  • FO Store
Sections
  • World
  • Coronavirus
  • US Election
  • Politics
  • Economics
  • Business
  • Culture
  • Sign Up
  • Login
  • Publish

Make Sense of the world

Unique insight from 2,000+ contributors in 80+ Countries

Close

Egypt: No Coup Without a Plan

By Stephan Roll & Max Gallien • Jul 16, 2013

The coup in Egypt is a consequence of the military’s direct interests.

By Stephan Roll and Max Gallien

For many observers, the return of the military to the political scene in Egypt did not come as a surprise, as it regards itself as a guardian of public order, which was under threat from the protests and their effects. However, the way in which the generals overhauled the entire political system, through the removal of Mohammed Morsi and the suspension of the constitution, did cause some astonishment. It is now becoming increasingly clear that the coup was not at all a spontaneous reaction to the protests, or even an attempt at strengthening democracy, but instead a carefully planned return to power based on the military’s direct political interests.

One key goal of the military is to secure the integrity of the Egyptian state. The generals had observed the worsening security situation, the proliferation of small firearms beyond rural areas, and the ongoing jihadist activities in the Sinai with growing concern.

However, the greater worry was the country’s economic situation. The paralyzation of the political system under the Morsi administration has led Egypt to the brink of economic collapse. The economic decline hangs like a sword of Damocles over the Egyptian military. Egypt prides itself as the 11th largest army in the world. On top of that, the military also controls a bloated economic empire that offers significant opportunities for an additional income for officers. However, all this is reliant on the economic support of the state, and could not be funded in the case of a national insolvency.

Finally, the generals were also concerned with the integrity of the military itself. Like in all other state institutions, there was also a fear of an Islamic infiltration. The threat of a disempowerment of the military, as it played out in Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Turkey, had to be averted as well.

Careful Planning

Based on these motivations, the Egyptian military has most likely been preparing its return to power for some time. Three assumptions may have encouraged them to put their plan into action.

First, the military could safely assume that large parts of the population would support its intervention, especially if the military leadership avoided the direct political role it played after the fall of Hosni Mubarak.

The mass protests on the anniversary of Morsi’s presidency confirmed this calculation; millions of protesters demanded the army’s intervention. In addition to the liberal opposition and young activists, even the largest Salafist party, the Coptic church, and Al-Azhar, Egypt’s most important Islamic institution, could be won over for the army’s move. The head of the constitutional court, not a general, was appointed president. However, the difficulties in forming a transitional government demonstrated the instability of this very heterogeneous coalition. Hence, the military could be forced to interfere more directly in the nation’s politics than it had originally planned.

Secondly, the military assumed that it would be possible to isolate the Muslim Brotherhood within the Islamist spectrum and weaken them politically.

At least for the moment, this calculation appears to have been correct as well. The Salafist al-Nour party already proved that they are willing to cooperate with the military. In the medium term, other Islamist groups are likely to follow this example and build on a return to the political system. Of course, there is also much sympathy for the Muslim Brotherhood within the Islamist spectrum. However, they are also seen as competitors. It has become more difficult for the Brotherhood to portray the argument with the military as a religious conflict.

Within the Muslim Brotherhood, criticism against the leadership’s uncompromising stance could arise. The Brotherhood is mainly recruiting members from Egypt’s middle class. Consequently, it is much better equipped for political participation than for grueling confrontations on the street. In the face of violent clashes, many Brotherhood supporters might find attractive alternatives in more moderate Islamist parties or turn their back on the political system. At the same time, young members of the Brotherhood are likely to become radicalized by the events and turn to jihadist groups. This could force the military to expand the security apparatus — although, this thought is unlikely to scare the generals.

Thirdly, the military assumed that the international community would accept its interference. This assumption, too, appears to have been correct. Twelve billion US dollars support from the Gulf states within just a couple of days suggest that arrangements were made prior to the coup. The financial support also demonstrates the relief of the ruling dynasties in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates about the change of power in Cairo. All three had been worried that the success of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt would embolden the opposition in their own countries.

The generals can also rely on their traditional allies, the US, and the EU. Washington will not turn its back on one of its most important allies in the Middle East because of a coup. The annual military support of $1.3 billion is not in danger. And despite some critical words, the European states also seem to rely on continuity. In the medium term, the relationship between Egypt and its partners in the west could even improve. If the new leadership in Cairo ends the trials against foreign NGOs, even the last doubts in western capitals are likely to fade.

The Outlook

In the short term, the plan of the military might be successful. The generals could continue to hold unchecked power as an institution outside of the political system. The financial support from abroad and the improvement of domestic security could temporarily stabilize the political and economic situation in Egypt. Ideally, Egypt would develop into a flawed democracy, with free elections and political participation in a framework that is controlled by the military — a Mubarak regime light.  

However, under these circumstances it will be impossible to reform the bloated and corrupt state apparatus, which is too closely intertwined with the military itself. A more fundamental modernization of the Egyptian economy is unrealistic, not only because the generals will not voluntarily surrender control over their economic empire. Social conflicts can be contained, but by no means resolved. In the long term, the plan of the military will not lead to stability in Egypt.

*[Note: A German version of this article was originally published by Süddeutsche Zeitung.]

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

Image: Copyright ©    Shutterstock. All Rights Reserved

Share Story
Categories360° Analysis, Middle East & North Africa, Politics Tagseconomy, Egypt, Egyptian Armed Forces, EU, FJP, Freedom and Justice Party, Hosni Mubarak, January 25 Revolution, Jihadism, June 30 Protests, Kuwait, Military Coup, Mohammed Morsi, Muslim Brotherhood, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sinai, United Arab Emirates, United States of America
Join our network of more than 2,000 contributors to publish your perspective, share your story and shape the global conversation. Become a Fair Observer and help us make sense of the world.

READ MORE IN THIS 360° SERIES

The Muslim Brotherhood: Islam and Democracy in Egypt
By Anando Bhakto • Jan 24, 2014
Referendum in Egypt: International Monitoring Helps the Regime
By Brozus-Roll • Jan 11, 2014
The Rise and Fall of the Salafi al-Nour Party in Egypt (Part 2/2)
By Jonathan AC Brown • Dec 29, 2013
The Rise and Fall of the Salafi al-Nour Party in Egypt (Part 1/2)
By Jonathan AC Brown • Dec 14, 2013
Washington and the Egyptian Tragedy
By Stephen Zunes • Aug 27, 2013
Is the Brotherhood Using Martyrdom as "Revolutionary Capital"?
By Paul Ashley • Aug 23, 2013
Egypt: The Emperor Has No Clothes
By Maziyar Ghiabi • Aug 20, 2013
Egypt: The Collapse of the Army-Brotherhood Alliance
By Omar Farahat • Aug 06, 2013
Egypt's Revolution Requires Us To Assume Responsibility
By Al-Sharif Nassef • Aug 01, 2013
Egypt: A Coup or the Will of the People?
By Clotilde de Swarte • Jul 30, 2013
Egypt's Revolution is Not a Liberal Conspiracy
By Sarah Eltantawi • Jul 23, 2013
Egypt: The Deep State and Democracy
By Rajai Masri • Jul 19, 2013
Mubarakism Without Mubarak: The Struggle for Egypt (Part 2)
By Joseph Massad • Jul 18, 2013
Mubarakism Without Mubarak: The Struggle for Egypt (Part 1)
By Joseph Massad • Jul 16, 2013
Military Coup in Egypt: A Recipe for Failure
By James M. Dorsey • Jul 09, 2013
Al-Tamarod: Rebellion in Egypt
By Sarah Eltantawi • Jul 01, 2013
Egypt Must Prove Democracy to Itself
By Al-Sharif Nassef • Jun 30, 2013

Leave a Reply Cancel reply

You must be logged in to post a comment.

Post navigation

Previous PostPrevious The Future of Green Building May Be Closer Than You Think (Part 2/2)
Next PostNext Al-Tamarod: Rebellion in Egypt
Subscribe
Register for $9.99 per month and become a member today.
Publish
Join our community of more than 2,500 contributors to publish your perspective, share your narrative and shape the global discourse.
Donate
We bring you perspectives from around the world. Help us to inform and educate. Your donation is tax-deductible.

Explore

  • About
  • Authors
  • FO Store
  • FAQs
  • Republish
  • Privacy Policy
  • Terms of Use
  • Contact

Regions

  • Africa
  • Asia Pacific
  • Central & South Asia
  • Europe
  • Latin America & Caribbean
  • Middle East & North Africa
  • North America

Topics

  • Politics
  • Economics
  • Business
  • Culture
  • Environment
  • Global Change
  • International Security
  • Science

Sections

  • 360°
  • The Interview
  • In-Depth
  • Insight
  • Quick Read
  • Video
  • Podcasts
  • Interactive
  • My Voice

Daily Dispatch


© Fair Observer All rights reserved
We Need Your Consent
We use cookies to give you the best possible experience. Learn more about how we use cookies or edit your cookie preferences. Privacy Policy. My Options I Accept
Privacy & Cookies Policy

Edit Cookie Preferences

The Fair Observer website uses digital cookies so it can collect statistics on how many visitors come to the site, what content is viewed and for how long, and the general location of the computer network of the visitor. These statistics are collected and processed using the Google Analytics service. Fair Observer uses these aggregate statistics from website visits to help improve the content of the website and to provide regular reports to our current and future donors and funding organizations. The type of digital cookie information collected during your visit and any derived data cannot be used or combined with other information to personally identify you. Fair Observer does not use personal data collected from its website for advertising purposes or to market to you.

As a convenience to you, Fair Observer provides buttons that link to popular social media sites, called social sharing buttons, to help you share Fair Observer content and your comments and opinions about it on these social media sites. These social sharing buttons are provided by and are part of these social media sites. They may collect and use personal data as described in their respective policies. Fair Observer does not receive personal data from your use of these social sharing buttons. It is not necessary that you use these buttons to read Fair Observer content or to share on social media.

 
Necessary
Always Enabled

These cookies essential for the website to function.

Analytics

These cookies track our website’s performance and also help us to continuously improve the experience we provide to you.

Performance
Uncategorized

This cookie consists of the word “yes” to enable us to remember your acceptance of the site cookie notification, and prevents it from displaying to you in future.

Preferences
Save & Accept