Fair Observer’s Video Producer Rohan Khattar Singh speaks with Saya Kiba, a professor at Japan’s Kobe City University of Foreign Studies, about Japan’s evolving role in the Indo-Pacific under Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi. As uncertainty clouds the future of the Quad — the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, a diplomatic partnership between the United States, Australia, India and Japan concerning Indo-Pacific security — Tokyo is strengthening ties with Australia and Southeast Asia through new diplomatic, economic and security initiatives. Kiba explains how Japan’s updated “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” strategy reflects a broader shift toward middle-power cooperation, while controversial discussions about exporting lethal weapons to the Philippines signal another change in Japan's security policy, with the country slowly moving away from its post-war pacifist stance.

Japan’s middle-power strategy

Khattar Singh opens by asking about Takaichi’s recent five-day tour of Vietnam and Australia, which took place from May 1 to May 5. Kiba says the trip reflects Japan’s effort to deepen both bilateral and multilateral partnerships at a time of growing uncertainty in global politics.

Australia has become especially important as Japan loosens restrictions on arms exports and explores joint defense development projects. Simultaneously, both countries are reassessing the Quad’s future.

Kiba argues that the Quad has lost momentum amid uncertainty surrounding American policy. “The Quad cooperation has actually stopped,” she says, pointing to the failure to hold a planned summit in India last year. In response, she believes countries like Japan and Australia are increasingly relying on middle-power coordination to preserve regional stability even when Washington appears inconsistent.

For Tokyo, Southeast Asia remains equally important. Kiba describes the region as Japan’s “most essential neighboring partner,” particularly during ongoing energy and supply-chain disruptions across the Indo-Pacific.

Updating the Indo-Pacific vision

A major focus of Takaichi’s Vietnam visit was the announcement of an updated version of Japan’s “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” strategy, commonly known as FOIP. Originally introduced by former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe a decade ago, FOIP sought to promote regional cooperation around maritime security, infrastructure and rule-based order.

Kiba explains that the revised framework places greater emphasis on emerging economic and technological challenges. The updated FOIP now includes cooperation on artificial intelligence, supply-chain resilience, renewable energy and public–private investment partnerships.

Japan is not distancing itself from the US despite its growing regional activism. Washington remains Tokyo’s only formal military ally, and Japan continues to coordinate closely with the US government. Instead, the new strategy reflects Japan’s attempt to modernize its regional relationships.

“The updated FOIP is more focusing on the co-creation facing the new challenges together,” Kiba explains. Rather than treating Southeast Asian countries as aid recipients, Japan increasingly frames them as equal partners confronting common problems such as energy insecurity and economic vulnerability.

This shift is also visible in Japan’s “Power Asia” initiative, announced earlier this year. The program seeks to expand regional energy cooperation, particularly around renewable energy and zero-emission technologies. Meanwhile, it links partners such as Australia, India and Southeast Asian states into a broader Indo-Pacific framework.

Australia and the rise of minilateral alliances

Khattar Singh notes that even as the Quad struggles to maintain momentum, bilateral cooperation between Japan and Australia continues to intensify. Kiba says the two countries now share far more aligned strategic concerns than they did in previous decades, especially regarding China’s expanding military presence.

Their cooperation increasingly extends beyond traditional defense issues into “economic security,” including supply chains, critical minerals and energy resilience. Both governments also support deeper engagement with Southeast Asia through new regional frameworks.

Kiba highlights the growing importance of “minilateral” arrangements — smaller coalitions built around specific strategic goals. During a recent visit to Indonesia, Japanese Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi and his Indonesian counterpart mentioned trilateral cooperation among Japan, Australia and Indonesia.

For Kiba, these emerging security networks represent one of the most significant developments in Indo-Pacific diplomacy. Instead of relying entirely on large multilateral organizations, middle powers are constructing flexible regional partnerships designed to address practical economic and security concerns.

Japan’s debate over lethal arms exports

The most controversial part of Japan’s new strategy involves defense exports. Khattar Singh asks Kiba about reports that Tokyo may sell lethal weapons, including destroyers, to the Philippines. Such a move would have been politically unthinkable under Japan’s traditional postwar pacifism.

Kiba confirms that recent cabinet decisions have dramatically expanded Japan’s legal ability to export military equipment. “Technically, we can export any kind of the defense equipment,” she says.

However, the process remains politically and bureaucratically difficult. The relaxation of export restrictions occurred through a cabinet decision rather than parliamentary legislation, a process she says has generated domestic criticism.

“Many people criticize, and I agree [with] that point,” Kiba notes. She argues that such a major shift should involve broader democratic debate. Japan and the Philippines have only agreed to begin discussions regarding the possible transfer of Taylorcraft TC-19 aircraft and destroyers. Any final agreement would require extensive parliamentary review, operational planning and legal guarantees concerning transparency, maintenance and non-resale provisions.

Kiba emphasizes that Japan’s bureaucratic safeguards remain extensive. Recipient countries must comply with strict procurement rules and operational restrictions, while both governments would need to negotiate thousands of pages of technical and legal documentation before any transfer could occur.

For now, Japan’s evolving defense policy reflects a country attempting to balance regional security pressures with the institutional constraints of its democratic and pacifist traditions.

[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.