• World
    • Africa
    • Asia Pacific
    • Central & South Asia
    • Europe
    • Latin America & Caribbean
    • Middle East & North Africa
    • North America
  • Coronavirus
  • Politics
    • US Election
    • US politics
    • Joe Biden
    • Brexit
    • European Union
    • India
    • Arab world
  • Economics
    • Finance
    • Eurozone
    • International Trade
  • Business
    • Entrepreneurship
    • Startups
    • Technology
  • Culture
    • Entertainment
    • Music
    • Film
    • Books
    • Travel
  • Environment
    • Climate change
    • Smart cities
    • Green Economy
  • Global Change
    • Education
    • Refugee Crisis
    • International Aid
    • Human Rights
  • International Security
    • ISIS
    • War on Terror
    • North Korea
    • Nuclear Weapons
  • Science
    • Health
  • 360 °
  • The Interview
  • In-Depth
  • Insight
  • Quick Read
  • Video
  • Podcasts
  • Interactive
  • My Voice
  • About
  • FO Store
Sections
  • World
  • Coronavirus
  • Politics
  • Economics
  • Business
  • Culture
  • Sign Up
  • Login
  • Publish

Make Sense of the world

Unique insight from 2,000+ contributors in 80+ Countries

Close

The Prevalence of Sectarianism: Hezbollah and the Syrian Civil War

By Josef Olmert • May 27, 2013

The civil war in Syria, despite claims to the contrary, is in its core a sectarian struggle. Josef Olmert, former Israeli peace negotiator, argues that the situation in Syria is an example of the historic Sunni-Shi'ite struggle in which Israel is not to blame.

Violent civil conflict and full-fledged civil wars have been a common feature in the modern history of the Levant. In one of the speeches explaining his involvement in the Lebanese Civil War of 1975, Hafiz al-Assad said bluntly that Lebanon and Syria were one country, artificially separated by the machinations of Western imperialism. Therefore, he went on, Syria had a full right to intervene in Lebanon. What Assad senior did not bluntly say was that the Lebanese Civil War could very well spread to Syria itself, endangering the regime he created, when he came to power in 1970. Hafiz al-Assad did not elaborate on that issue, as he wanted to refrain from referring to the problem which was and still is at the core of the chronic instability in both Syria and Lebanon: the sectarian divide, and the consequent inability to establish political communities in both countries, which would transcend primordial ethnic, religious, and sectarian loyalties.

The Elephant in the Room

This problem is the elephant in the room; one of the subjects that Arab statesmen, as well as intellectuals and civic leaders, do not like to expand on or even admit its existence. If there is any admission, the fault squarely falls on the West and Israel; conspiracy theories are floated around and the bottom line is such, that no real soul-searching process is taking place, and it is left to very few brave journalists and intellectuals, mainly ones who are outside of the Middle East, to argue the obvious.

According to the Syrian regime, the civil war in Syria is a struggle against ‘’gangs of terrorists,” aided from external actors like Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the US, and Israel. The rebels are much closer to the truth when they claim, that they delegitimize the Alawite-led regime simply for being a minority-led regime, but these statements are usually given by people on the ground. The leadership of the rebels outside of Syria talks very differently, also trying its best to downplay the sectarian nature of the struggle.

The same elements of self-deception were clearly on display when the Lebanese killed each other so ferociously in the country's 15-year-long civil war. It was regarded by many as a war of ‘’Left’’ versus ‘’Right,’’ ‘’poor versus rich,’’ or ‘’Western and Israeli agents against Arab Nationalists.’’ This way the Christian-Muslim dimension was artificially downplayed, although it was the main characteristic of the fighting. One community in Lebanon, however, was very clearly on record accepting the sectarian feature of the struggle. These were the Shi'ites, the classic downtrodden sect of the Lebanese mosaic.

The Shi'ite-Alawite Connection

First, it was Imam Musa al-Sadr, the leader who organized the Shi’ite community and turned it into an effective political force that started the alliance with the Alawite regime of Hafiz al-Assad in 1973; an alliance which has survived all the ups and downs of the ever shifty Lebanese situation. The Imam granted a Shi’ite religious sanction to the Alawites, thus confirming the sectarian basis of the alliance with the Assad regime. Then came the Islamic Revolution in Iran, a Shi’ite eruption, which from day one was perceived by Saudi Arabia, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, and other Arab Sunni states as a clear challenge to the long-held Sunni domination of the Arab Middle East. The Saudis and Saddam had very little in common, but when the latter invaded Iran in September 1980 to nip the Iranian-Shi’ite danger in the bud, the former provided him with generous support.

Alawite Hafiz al-Assad, with the Shi’ite mantle bestowed on him by Sadr, who himself belonged to the Lebanese offshoot of a family of Iraqi-Shi'ite clergy and long persecuted by Saddam, was Iran’s only Arab ally in a war which can be defined as the first Sunni-Shi'ite war in the modern history of the Middle East. To be sure, Hafez al-Assad had many reasons for wishing the defeat of Saddam Hussein; it was not just sectarianism which led him to support Iran, but it was still the case, that in a Shi’ite–Sunni confrontation, he found himself alongside the Shi'ites. Nor was it a coincidence that, throughout the Lebanese Civil War and its long aftermath until this very day, Syria maintained its alliance with Hezbollah which, after the Iranian revolution and the disappearance of Imam Sadr in Libya in 1979, became the strongest Shi’ite organization in Lebanon.

While Hezbollah, Syria of the Assads and the Alawites shared the same rhetoric against the common enemy Israel, it was not ‘’the Zionist regime’’ which was the basis of their alliance. Syria, contrary to the Iranian-Hezbollah position, went to the Madrid Peace Conference in 1991 and was engaged in subsequent peace talks with Israel, lasting for almost 20 years. The Syrian-Israeli border was the quietest of Israel’s borders since 1973, contrary to the Israeli-Lebanese border; and when Hezbollah and Israel fought the second Israeli-Lebanese war in 2006, Syria was conspicuously absent from the fighting.

The alliance was about Shi’ites and Alawites facing up to the Sunnis in the Levant; it was sectarian-motivated. It is exactly this element which today guides the Iranians and Hezbollah with regard to the Syrian Civil War, as it is the same sectarian factor which motivates Iraq being the only Arab state supporting Bashar al-Assad.

Hezbollah is losing a lot with its involvement in Syria. First, the organization has suffered substantial casualties; it has lost any support it still entertained in the Arab world as a result of the ‘’victory’’ against Israel in 2006; and surely it is resented in Lebanon, whose Sunni and Maronite-Christian population mostly supports the rebels in Syria. Clearly, Hezbollah is significantly bruised; not good news for an organization whose self-styled raison d’etre is the jihad against Israel, and not against fellow Arabs.

For many years, Lebanese political factions representing all political stripes and religious affiliations called upon Hezbollah to disarm, in order to allow the restoration of full normalization in the country. The Shi'ites refused, claiming that they needed to maintain the militia in order to continue the "resistance" to Israel. Well, the reality is that the militia was kept in place in order to be another tool used by the Sh'iite Islamic Republic of Iran in its drive to spread its influence in the region. Judging by the reactions in Lebanon, Hezbollah will be called to account for that. The fighting in Tripoli is just the beginning.

Here we have another illustration of the old Middle East rule that it is always convenient to use the classic boogeyman, Israel, at a time when the real motivation is elsewhere. In this case, it is the Shi’ite-Sunni War.

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

Image: Copyright © Shutterstock. All Rights Reserved

Share Story
Categories360° Analysis, International Security, Middle East & North Africa, Politics TagsAlawite, Bashar Al Assad, Hafiz Al Assad, Hezbollah, Iman Sadr, Israel, Josef Olmert, Saddam Hussein, Saudi Arabia, Sectarianism, Shia, Sunni, Syria, Syrian Civil War
Join our network of more than 2,000 contributors to publish your perspective, share your story and shape the global conversation. Become a Fair Observer and help us make sense of the world.

READ MORE IN THIS 360° SERIES

The Geopolitics of the Syrian Civil War (Part 2/2)
By Joseph Hughes • Jul 31, 2014
Syria’s Salafi Awakening: Existential Psychological Primers (Part 2/2)
By Zach Goldberg • Jul 31, 2014
The Geopolitics of the Syrian Civil War (Part 1/2)
By Joseph Hughes • Jul 20, 2014
Syria’s Salafi Awakening: Existential Psychological Primers (Part 1/2)
By Zach Goldberg • Jul 15, 2014
The Hezbollah Cavalcade: Iran’s Important Weapon in the Middle East
By Nicholas Heras & Phillip Smyth • Jun 07, 2014
100 Years Later: Lessons for the US in Syria
By Max Reibman • May 21, 2014
France's Gung-Ho Policy in Syria
By Clotilde de Swarte • Mar 28, 2014
The Fallout From Syria: Hate Speech in Indonesia
By Navhat Nuraniyah • Mar 25, 2014
Policy From Inside the Perimeter: No Finger in the Wind
By David Holdridge • Mar 12, 2014
Returning From Syria: Terrorism in the West
By Paul Ashley • Mar 01, 2014
The End of a Unified Syria
By Carl Anthony Wege • Sep 04, 2013
Chemical Attacks and Military Interventions
By Omar S. Dahi • Aug 28, 2013
The Alawite Question
By Dina Yazdani • Aug 22, 2013
International Jihad and the Syrian Conflict
By Nicholas Heras & Aaron Zelin • Aug 07, 2013
Syria and the Crumbling Region: A Look at Lebanon
By Helios Global • Jul 17, 2013
Who Will Be Syria's Knight Sans Armor? (Part 1/2)
By Jennifer Helgeson • May 18, 2013
Stop Syria From Becoming an Afghan-Style Disaster
By Dmitri Trenin • Mar 21, 2013
Syria: All the King's Horses...
By David Holdridge • Feb 14, 2013
Syria: Political Dialogue and the Rise of Salafists
By Rajai Masri • Feb 02, 2013
The Middle East in 2013
By Juan Cole • Jan 01, 2013
Will Brahimi Reach a Breakthrough in Syria?
By Vijay Prashad • Dec 30, 2012
Is Chaos in Syria the Way Out?
By Maksymilian Czuperski • Nov 18, 2012
Syria: At the Epicenter of Regional Fault Lines
By Adrian Shahbaz • Jul 23, 2012
Libya to Syria: R2P and the ‘Double Standards’ Issue
By Jean-Baptiste Jeangene Vilmer • Jul 23, 2012
Russia Supports Syria For Old Times’ Sake
By Anna Pivovarchuk • Jul 10, 2012
Assad at the Tipping Point
By Jeffrey Laurenti • Jun 10, 2012
Don't Despair on Annan’s Syria Plan, Yet
By Jeffrey Laurenti • Apr 24, 2012
Annan Plan Up Against the Syrian Wall
By Jeffrey Laurenti • Apr 10, 2012
The Revolution Will Be Uploaded: Citizen Journalism in Homs
By Nicholas Heras • Mar 04, 2012
Adding Fuel to Syria's Fire
By Foreign Policy in Focus • Feb 16, 2012
Russia’s Hard-Nosed Realism in Syria: The Roots and Reasoning
By Gordon Hahn • Feb 16, 2012
The UN's Return on Syria
By Jeffrey Laurenti • Feb 15, 2012
Is Assad’s Syria ‘Too Important to Fail’ for the Resistance Axis?
By Kevjn Lim • Feb 13, 2012
A Test of Wills: The Arab League Asserts Itself in Syria
By Nicholas Heras • Feb 13, 2012
Chaos in Syria
By Ari Katz • Feb 05, 2012
Damascus: Assad's Fortress
By Ayya Harraz • Jan 27, 2012
"Cold War" in West Asia: Asia Pacific Nations Look On
By Zorawar Daulet Singh • Jan 26, 2012
The Need for Intervention in Syria
By Hina Mahmood • Jan 12, 2012

Leave a Reply Cancel reply

You must be logged in to post a comment.

Post navigation

Previous PostPrevious Images of the Colonial Past and Identity Politics on the Korean Peninsula
Next PostNext India in 2012: Strategic and Security Challenges Beckon
Subscribe
Register for $9.99 per month and become a member today.
Publish
Join our community of more than 2,500 contributors to publish your perspective, share your narrative and shape the global discourse.
Donate
We bring you perspectives from around the world. Help us to inform and educate. Your donation is tax-deductible.

Explore

  • About
  • Authors
  • FO Store
  • FAQs
  • Republish
  • Privacy Policy
  • Terms of Use
  • Contact

Regions

  • Africa
  • Asia Pacific
  • Central & South Asia
  • Europe
  • Latin America & Caribbean
  • Middle East & North Africa
  • North America

Topics

  • Politics
  • Economics
  • Business
  • Culture
  • Environment
  • Global Change
  • International Security
  • Science

Sections

  • 360°
  • The Interview
  • In-Depth
  • Insight
  • Quick Read
  • Video
  • Podcasts
  • Interactive
  • My Voice

Daily Dispatch


© Fair Observer All rights reserved
We Need Your Consent
We use cookies to give you the best possible experience. Learn more about how we use cookies or edit your cookie preferences. Privacy Policy. My Options I Accept
Privacy & Cookies Policy

Edit Cookie Preferences

The Fair Observer website uses digital cookies so it can collect statistics on how many visitors come to the site, what content is viewed and for how long, and the general location of the computer network of the visitor. These statistics are collected and processed using the Google Analytics service. Fair Observer uses these aggregate statistics from website visits to help improve the content of the website and to provide regular reports to our current and future donors and funding organizations. The type of digital cookie information collected during your visit and any derived data cannot be used or combined with other information to personally identify you. Fair Observer does not use personal data collected from its website for advertising purposes or to market to you.

As a convenience to you, Fair Observer provides buttons that link to popular social media sites, called social sharing buttons, to help you share Fair Observer content and your comments and opinions about it on these social media sites. These social sharing buttons are provided by and are part of these social media sites. They may collect and use personal data as described in their respective policies. Fair Observer does not receive personal data from your use of these social sharing buttons. It is not necessary that you use these buttons to read Fair Observer content or to share on social media.

 
Necessary
Always Enabled

These cookies essential for the website to function.

Analytics

These cookies track our website’s performance and also help us to continuously improve the experience we provide to you.

Performance
Uncategorized

This cookie consists of the word “yes” to enable us to remember your acceptance of the site cookie notification, and prevents it from displaying to you in future.

Preferences
Save & Accept