If the release of prisoners includes Nabeel Rajab, King Hamad will have signaled that he is serious about ending the cycle of repression in Bahrain.
The decision on April 22 by Bahrain’s King Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa to restore the citizenship of 551 individuals may be a first step in what remains a long and difficult road toward dialogue and reconciliation. Bahrain has been wracked by more than eight years of civil unrest that has severely damaged the kingdom’s economy, seen thousands of protesters jailed and nearly 1,000 stripped of their citizenship.
The Gulf island’s main political opposition groups have been banned and their leaders jailed. In June 2017, Al-Wasat, Bahrain’s only independent news site was shuttered, effectively silencing free media. Freedom of expression, too, has been severely curtailed. The human rights activist Nabeel Rajab is currently serving a five-year sentence for tweets that criticized the war in Yemen and conditions in the country’s main prison, Jau. Another activist, Abdulhadi al-Khawaja, is serving a life sentence and Sheikh Ali Salman, the leader of al-Wefaq, the largest opposition movement, was jailed for 15 years which on appeal was altered to life. Other oppositionists and human rights activists are either in prison in Bahrain or in exile in the West.
The vast majority of those affected by the government’s crackdown on dissent are Shia Muslims, the majority indigenous community in a kingdom ruled for more than two centuries by the Sunni al-Khalifa family. Shia Bahrainis have long complained of discrimination in job hiring, housing, education and other facilities provided by the state. They point to a gerrymandered political system entrenching the status quo and the failure of the ruling family to deliver on promises made in 2001 for a more equitable power-sharing arrangement. When those concerns boil over and lead to unrest, the government responds with harsh measures.
Indeed, the history of Bahrain since it gained independence from Britain in 1971 has been one of persistent cycles of reform and repression, intrinsically linked one to the other. When reform demands go too far and threaten the position of the ruling family, repression kicks in. That in turn becomes excessive and a process of reform begins anew.
Bahrain elected its first parliament in 1973. But after legislators refused to approve a draconian state security law, parliament was dissolved just two years later. The then and still prime minister, Khalifa bin Salman al-Khalifa, together with his brother Isa, the emir, ruled with a firm hand. They were aided by Ian Henderson, a Scotsman who ran the state security apparatus with such ruthless efficiency that he earned the sobriquet “Butcher of Bahrain” from regime opponents.
A coup attempt in 1981 and an uprising in the 1990s calling for democratic reform led to periods of intense repression. However, the repression eased when the emir died in 1999 and his son, Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa, succeeded him. Hamad introduced a reform program that saw the state of emergency, in place since 1975, lifted. The state security law was abolished. Political opponents and human rights activists were released from prison, and others were allowed and encouraged to return from exile under a general amnesty. Restrictions on the media were loosened.
In February 2001, a referendum was held in which Bahrainis voted overwhelmingly in support of the National Action Charter, a roadmap toward the creation of a constitutional monarchy. In 2002, Bahrain adopted a new constitution along the lines of the charter’s provisions, with Hamad declaring himself king. For the next several years, though many Shia continued to feel marginalized and discriminated against, the reform agenda was the order of the day, a state of affairs that benefited the country both economically and politically.
The Arab Spring and the events of February and March 2011 saw the cycle of repression return with a vengeance. Peaceful calls for a faster pace of reform gained huge support in the kingdom across sectarian lines. In a country with an indigenous population of less than 700,000, it is estimated more than 100,000 people took to the streets of the capital, Manama. The ruling family saw the reform demands as a major threat, the most serious it had ever faced. There was good reason for concern: Popular protests had already toppled two Arab strongmen in North Africa.
For its part, Saudi Arabia feared that should the Khalifa family give ground, that would serve to empower its own Shia community, heavily discriminated against and the majority population in the oil-rich Eastern Province adjacent to Bahrain. On March 14, 2011, Saudi Arabia, joined by the United Arab Emirates, sent troops down the causeway linking Bahrain to the Saudi mainland. Demonstrations were crushed and protesters routed by Bahraini security and military forces. Dozens were killed, hundreds wounded and thousands arbitrarily jailed. Torture in detention was widespread with at least two detainees being beaten to death.
King Hamad, facing international criticism, commissioned a tribunal of human rights experts chaired by the distinguished law professor, Cherif Bassiouni. The Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry was, and remains, the only independent analysis of its kind dealing with the events of the Arab Spring, and it is to the king’s credit that he commissioned it.
Three days before the court in #Bahrain issues a verdict in the case of #brave prisoner of conscience @NABEELRAJAB. Add your voice to the thunderclap to support the release of Nabeel at https://t.co/93q6wJcIHG pic.twitter.com/H4s2qZopqm
— Reina Wehbi (@ReinaWehbi) February 18, 2018
Bassiouni’s report, released in November 2011, was a damning indictment of how the government had handled what had been a largely peaceful call for democratic reform. The king accepted the report in full and promised to carry out all its recommendations, many of which relate to the police and security forces. Critics argue that in the years since the report, very few of the recommendations have been fully implemented. The government takes the position that most have.
Dialogue and Reconciliation
What is not in dispute is that the regime, citing security concerns, has continued to bear down hard on any form of dissent. Dialogue and trust between the opposition and the ruling family has completely broken down. However, that may be about to change. On April 26, Hasan Shafaei, an official at the Bahraini Embassy in London met with this author. He said that King Hamad wants to “encourage opportunities to create a better situation.” Shafaei is a former activist. In 2002, he was a founding member of the Bahrain Center for Human Rights with Nabeel Rajab and Abdulhadi al-Khawaja. He said that, in his opinion, the opposition had “missed opportunities in the past” and urged it to “take advantage of this goodwill from the king.”
The citizenship restoration decree should be seen as King Hamad’s signal that now is the time to move forward to dialogue. Significantly, included in the 551 were 138 names of individuals who had been stripped of their citizenship and sentenced to between three years and life in a mass trial just a few days earlier, on April 16. Though the prison sentences stand, King Hamad could not have stated more clearly that citizenship stripping should not be used by the courts as punishment. It is a step that will not have pleased some within the ruling family, but it is as strong an indication as any that the cycle of repression could end and an agenda of reconciliation begin.
To speed up the process of reconciliation, Shafaei, a human rights adviser to the embassy, said that “more good news was coming.” That could include the release of political prisoners, including Rajab. He noted several recent meetings between the prime minister and a senior religious leader of the Shia community, Sheikh Abdullah al-Ghurifi. Those meetings, this author was told, had the full approval of the ailing Ayatollah Isa Qassim, the highest religious authority for Bahraini Shias. (However, Sheikh Qassim was not among those who had his citizenship restored by the king after having it revoked in 2016.)
Shafaei also pointed to a new alternative sentencing law passed last year that includes the imposition of community service sentences, house arrest, electronic tagging and attending training and rehabilitation programs. Although it was not a point Shafaei made, the new law has the virtue of helping to deal with serious overcrowding and the consequent poor conditions faced by inmates at Jau Prison.
Ali Alaswad is a senior al-Wefaq politician, now in exile in London. When told of Shafaei’s comments, he played down the significance of both the meetings with the prime minister and the restoration of citizenship. “[King Hamad] wants us to say thank you when their citizenship was taken for no reason.” Alaswad told this author there are 4,500 political prisoners in detention, adding “we will not be happy till they are back home.”
At the same time, though, Alaswad signaled there is room for some optimism. Though al-Wefaq is not willing to enter into a formal dialogue with the government simply on the basis of the king’s citizenship decision, that could change. “Release some political prisoners and we are ready to reconsider. A prisoner release is a good opportunity for dialogue,” he said.
Within that statement lurks the potential to break the long and damaging stalemate that, since 2011, has affected every level of Bahraini society. Should the king follow through on what Hasan Shafaei has called “good news” and release some of the prisoners over the Islamic month of Ramadan, the arduous task of building trust and finding common ground can begin. It will be a sign for all Bahrainis that they can dare to hope there is an end to an awful period in their history. It would be useful, too, to restore Sheikh Isa Qassem’s nationality. Finally, should the release of prisoners include Nabeel Rajab, an internationally-recognized human rights voice, King Hamad will have signaled to the world that he is serious about ending the cycle of repression.
*[Gulf State Analytics is a partner institution of Fair Observer.]
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.