Fair Observer’s Video Producer Rohan Khattar Singh speaks with Brendan Howe, Dean at Ewha Womans University in Seoul, about South Korea’s evolving foreign policy in a time of great-power turbulence. Their discussion traces Seoul’s balancing act between the United States, China and North Korea while exploring whether the country can emerge as a regional leader in its own right.

Multilateralism and foreign policy

Khattar Singh opens the conversation by asking Howe to clarify the frameworks shaping South Korea’s diplomacy. Howe explains that multilateralism seeks the broadest participation — global institutions like the United Nations or the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) aim to give all members a voice. Yet as membership expands, reaching consensus grows more difficult, and major powers resist being bound by equal rules.

That frustration has driven a shift toward minilateralism — smaller, purpose-driven partnerships focused on defense and technology. Most in East Asia revolve around the US. South Korea, long caught between larger neighbors, remains embedded in the American hub-and-spoke alliance structure that dates back to the early Cold War.

The Korean War, fought under a United Nations mandate, left a deep imprint on the country’s strategic identity. It revealed both the promise and limits of global cooperation — and convinced many South Koreans that national survival depends on active engagement with the rules-based order.

US relations and Seoul’s hedging

Although South Korea’s alliance with Washington remains central, Howe notes that Seoul has been left outside key US-led groups like the Quad, AUKUS and Five Eyes. A new trilateral arrangement with Japan and the US aims to close that gap, yet South Korean policymakers, he says, are “not really happy about any of this.” The country prefers flexibility and dislikes being pressed into rigid choices between security and commerce.

For decades, Seoul described itself as a middle power — a state that uses diplomacy and specialization to amplify limited resources. Today, Howe argues, South Korea’s economic and military weight exceeds that category. It is a second-tier power: not a superpower, but far more influential than traditional middle states. Militarily, it aligns closely with Washington, though enthusiasm for the minilateral model is waning, even in the US.

While conservatives have long favored coordination with Japan and the US, the current progressive administration has maintained these ties. In Howe’s view, that continuity gives South Korea the freedom to widen cooperation with Japan, Australia and ASEAN without weakening its alliance with Washington.

Preemptive diplomacy and regional security

Turning to North Korea, Howe emphasizes how limited international institutions have become in shaping the behavior of its capital, Pyongyang. UN sanctions have been undermined by Chinese and Russian disregard, and earlier negotiations, such as the Six-Party Talks, failed to achieve their goals.

Seoul has begun to practice what Howe calls preemptive diplomacy: acting early to stay part of the conversation. Its willingness to discuss recognizing North Korea’s nuclear status temporarily aims to restart talks. Though controversial, this signals a determination to influence outcomes rather than merely react to them.

Meanwhile, Howe warns that the major powers — the US, China and Russia — are behaving “like monsters in a Godzilla movie,” leaving smaller states to absorb the fallout. He argues that this instability compels South Korea to think creatively about defense and deterrence, anticipating crises rather than waiting for them.

ASEAN and the Indo-Pacific order

South Korea’s New Southern Policy reflects a forward-looking regional vision. Through deeper ties with ASEAN, especially Vietnam and Indonesia, Seoul applies its own experience as a country that achieved economic transformation under difficult circumstances. Its cooperation extends beyond commerce to humanitarian aid, peacekeeping and disaster relief — including military assistance to the Philippines after Typhoon Haiyan in 2013.

These initiatives show that influence can arise from competence and credibility. During the pandemic, South Korea’s efficient vaccine outreach contrasted sharply with the erratic behavior of larger powers. By emphasizing public health, climate resilience and development, Seoul has positioned itself as a pragmatic problem-solver and a reliable regional partner.

Can South Korea lead?

Looking ahead, Howe envisions a network of capable democracies — including Germany, Japan, Australia, the United Kingdom and South Korea — that could “punch above their weight” by leading on technology, development and human security while the great powers remain mired in rivalry.

South Korea’s task, he concludes, is to balance universal ideals with regional pragmatism: to uphold its alliance with the US while advancing an Asian concept of security that values social welfare and economic stability alongside military strength. By hedging less between Washington and Beijing and more between global and regional visions of order, Seoul is redefining leadership for the 21st century.

Khattar Singh ends by asking whether South Korea can truly become a leader in this divided landscape. Howe answers that success depends on how deftly Seoul manages its overlapping webs of trade, security and diplomacy — but few nations, he adds, are better prepared for the task.

[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]

[Note: This FO Talks/FO Live is part of the Osaka School of International Public Policy’s “Peace and Human Security in Asia: Toward a Meaningful Japan-Korea Partnership” project supported by the Korea Foundation.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.