Atul Singh and Glenn Carle delve into the complex and evolving power dynamics of the Middle East, particularly focusing on the roles of the United States, Israel and Iran, and the significant shifts observed since Hamas’s notorious attacks in Gaza on October 7, 2023. They provide a deep dive into the perspectives and objectives of each of these major players, the strategic implications of recent events and the potential long-term consequences for the region and beyond.

The speakers introduce the three primary actors: the US, Israel and Iran, framing the discussion around the American attack that occurred in the weeks preceding the conversation.

Israel’s perspective and objectives

The dominant political faction in Israel, led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, is the right-wing, on whom Netanyahu’s political survival depends. Netanyahu is running a coalition government that includes hardline far-right figures like Minister of Finance Bezalel Smotrich and Minister of National Security Itamar Ben-Gvir. Netanyahu is keen to prolong his rule because he fears trial in court on corruption charges. Smotrich and Ben-Gvir have extreme objectives, including seizure and colonization of the West Bank and Gaza. This implies the expulsion of Palestinians and the destruction of the Iranian regime.

Israel assesses that Iran poses an existential threat because Tehran is developing a nuclear weapon. Israeli leaders deem this as “absolutely unacceptable,” because this would put “Israel’s and all Jews’ survival … on the brink of extermination.” Therefore, Israelis consider regime change in Iran to be fundamental and necessary to alter the current strategic equation. This task is believed to be beyond Israel’s sole capabilities — it requires US involvement.

Atul and Glenn highlight recent Israeli actions, including the decapitation of top Iranian leadership. This was a “spectacular special ops Mossad” operation and “one of the great intelligence operations in history.” Israelis also hit a number of Iranian nuclear and missile sites and claimed control of Iranian airspace. Despite Iranian counterclaims, the Israelis experienced far fewer casualties (an order of magnitude less) than they had anticipated, which led to a less pessimistic reality than their initial fears. This suggested Iranian counter strike capabilities were less powerful than feared. However, the economic dislocation for Israel has been immense.

There is a strong belief among Israelis that the Iranian regime is a “paper tiger,” which is utterly corrupt and infiltrated at all levels. Atul and Glenn cite the killing of the Palestinian leader of Hamas, Ismail Haniyeh, in a VIP guest house — equivalent to killing someone in Blair House that is next to the American White House — as evidence of the deep Israeli infiltration into the Iranian regime. This suggests that this regime, despite its outward appearance, is not as cohesive, effective or united as it was after the 1979 revolution.

For Netanyahu, the timing of the attack on Iran was crucial: “If not now, when? If not us, who?” He views himself as the “savior of Israel” and the “guarantor of Israeli security.” With Hamas weakened, Hezbollah’s top leadership dead and the Assad regime in Syria gone, Israelis perceive a significant opportunity to strike Iran. Netanyahu believes the Iranian proxies present minimal danger, giving Israel a historic opportunity to attack Iran.

The ultimate goal for Israelis is regime change in Iran. A new liberal, tolerant and friendly regime could potentially restore the pre-1979 amicable relationship between the two nations. Atul and Glenn believe that the 1979 revolution, which brought in a “crazy Islamic regime” based on Shia ideology, fanaticism and opposition to the US, was an unnecessary development. The US was manipulated by the UK in 1953 to conduct a coup against a democratically elected Mohammad Mossadegh. In 2025, some even believe the best course of action would be to eliminate Ayatollah Khamenei. Israelis think they can exert pressure and squeeze Iran due to its declining birth rate and persecution of Sunni minorities.

Atul and Glenn also explain the Begin Doctrine, which underpins Israeli national security. Per this doctrine, “none of Israel’s enemies or potential enemies should have or be able to have nuclear weapons.” Israel followed this doctrine to destroy an Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981 and Syrian nuclear facilities in 2007. Note that Netanyahu attempted to apply this doctrine against Iran twice between 2009 and 2013. 

Netanyahu champions a hardline national security strategy but not all of Israel supports it. Many Israeli politicians, as well as intelligence and special forces personnel, oppose Netanyahu and his right-wing allies. The former head of Shin Bet left after much controversy. Historically, a strong majority of the Israeli population has favored a two-state solution and a negotiated solution with Iran, but this group is not currently in power. Many Israeli politicians and security professionals view the far-right’s desire for regime change as “a bridge too far.”

The US perspective

The US intelligence community’s assessment, as presented by Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard, differs from Israel’s dominant view: Iran is not manufacturing or possessing a nuclear weapon, and Ayatollah Khamenei has not reauthorized its manufacture. However, Iran has been “secretly developing weapons-grade fissile material,” which has only one use: a nuclear weapon. Iran is estimated to be anywhere from “days,” as Israelis assert, to “a good number of months” away from manufacturing one.

US President Donald Trump faced a dilemma: He had vowed not to engage in “forever wars” (precluding an invasion) but also stated he would not allow Iran to develop a nuclear weapon. He ultimately aligned with the right-wing Israeli assessment that Iran’s capability to manufacture a weapon constituted an existential threat, irrespective of whether they currently possessed one. Faced with an “impossible dilemma,” Trump chose a minimalist attack on Iran’s nuclear capabilities and declared victory. He came to realize that regime change in Iran was not feasible and attempting it would make the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq “look like a birthday party.”

Iran’s perspective and resilience

The Iranian regime’s top priority is survival. Many analysts view them as “not crazies at all” but “very subtle and astute,” repeatedly signaling a desire for a resolution short of open war. In response to the US attack, Iran informed the Qatari government (and thus the US) in advance of their planned response, which involved a one-off missile attack on America’s largest base in the Middle East — symbolizing a strike at the heart of the US presence — before stopping.

Despite Israeli beliefs, Iran is more cohesive than its enemies imagine. It has demonstrated an ability to survive chaos, notably during the eight-year war with Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein in the 1980s. Note that Western powers and the CIA backed Saddam. After the attacks, Iran could experience zeereh parcham — “rally to the flag” — and nationalism could make regime change far more difficult.

Atul and Glenn emphasize that Iran retains the potential to manufacture a nuclear weapon because “knowledge” cannot be killed, even if all involved scientists were assassinated. Iran is a “sophisticated society with millions of brilliant people who can study science.” They also note that Iran’s nuclear program was initiated by Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, not the mullahs. The Iranian moral police have reportedly “dialed down” because of protests. There is little likelihood of an imminent revolution. Significantly, 20% of Iran’s population still lives in villages and largely supports the current regime. The Iranians want “nuclear insurance.” They note that poorer neighboring Pakistan has managed to avoid foreign interference for all its faults because it has the nuclear weapon.

Note that the Iranian counter strike was not “painless for Israel.” It hit business districts and apartment buildings, causing immense economic strain.

Broader implications and strategic changes

Atul and Glenn highlight profound strategic and structural changes to the power dynamics in the Middle East since October 7, 2023. Israel’s “brilliant decimation” (more than decimation because that means a tenth) of Hezbollah and Hamas has forced them into a defensive posture. The Assad regime in Syria has fallen as well. Israel has achieved lasting structural change.

However, the deeper issue of Iran’s nuclear potential remains unaddressed. While the Iranian regime may be weakened and subject to collapse in the long run (“stable until the day it’s not,” “things last until they don’t”), it has survived to fight another day. If the mullahs fall, they are unlikely to be replaced by women protestors in the streets. Rather, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) might replace the mullahs unless the women can convince a section of the military to side with them.

The British, drawing on a longer historical memory, express skepticism about swift regime change. They recognize Iran’s “imperial memory” and argue the nation is more cohesive than its enemies imagine. The Brits also point out that killing top military officers, while providing short-term tactical advantage, might lead to their replacement by younger, more competent and potentially more aggressive higher-testosterone individuals (“proper nutters” who are happy to have bullets with their names on them).

The most recent conflict has broader implications:

• The US is now back in the Middle East, leading to lower attention and lesser support for Ukraine.
• China will have a freer hand in the Far East. It can now increase pressure on Taiwan’s sovereignty through more incursions into international and Taiwanese waters. The Chinese will shift the status quo of what is acceptable before military intervention.
• Pakistan will feel less constrained and controlled by the US, potentially leading to increased assertiveness against India and “fireworks by September.”

The current situation is a “fragile truce,” with both Israelis and Iranians believing there is “unfinished business.” While there may be no immediate large-scale flare-up, Iran will “lick its wounds” and strive to obtain nuclear weapons for “insurance” against foreign intervention and regime change.

The “most likely happy solution” from a Western perspective is proposed as an “Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) evolution,” where the Iranian regime evolves without collapsing. The current doctrinaire mullahs who are in their 70s and 80s are replaced by more educated and internationalist successors.

[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.