[This is the second part of a four-part series. To read more, see Part 1 here.]

Josef Olmert: Hi, hello to all my watchers and followers and readers. This is episode number two in my series on US–Israel relations. And a little correction to what I said in the beginning of the first episode: There will be four episodes, not three. And as you recall, we ended the first episode with reference to a turning point — a historic turning point in the relations between the two countries and in the history of Israel altogether in the Middle East — which is the War of 1967, also known as the June War or the Six-Day War.

We’ll come to that momentarily. But allow me first to kind of repeat, for the sake of those who might have missed part of the first episode, the main points that we made in the first episode about the beginning of American–Israeli relations. And this related to what happened in the Second World War with President FDR, and then the momentous decisions taken by President Harry Truman of recognizing the State of Israel immediately upon its establishment, and beforehand, the support for the UN resolution about the partition of Palestine, if you will. The first resolution about the two-state solution was rejected by the Arabs. And that’s in reference to what people say today about the two-state solution.

And then we talked about the early years of the relationships, with the bumps, ups and downs. And a very big down was the way Eisenhower treated Israel in 1956 in the Suez War. In the 1950s, the main supporter of Israel in terms of supplying arms and also diplomatic support was France, which is interesting — mostly when it was under the French Socialist Party at that time, as opposed to the French Socialists of today. The French Socialists of the 1950s — Guy Mollet, for example, and others — were very, very pro-Israel for all kinds of reasons, and also supplied Israel lavishly with arms.

All this started to change with the rise of General de Gaulle to power in what is called the Fifth Republic as of May of 1958, and came to an abrupt end in the War of ‘67 that we shall refer to soon.

The Cold War heats up in the Middle East

Josef Olmert: But in the case of the US, the beginning of some military relations started with President JFK, who supplied Israel air defense systems, the Hawk missiles, with all kinds of strings attached, you know. But still, it was not until 1967 that things changed in a very dramatic way between the two countries.

Now, the War of 1967 is a huge topic that I’m not going to get into in this particular series, but I have to mention a few points about it which will give the background to what will happen later on between the US and Israel. This was a war that had to do with the Cold War, which raged all over the world at that time. And in the early 1960s, the West won in some areas. The West lost in other areas. The Soviets won in some areas, if you will. Algeria became independent. You can argue a defeat to the Western world, even though General de Gaulle was the one who granted it to the Algerians. The Cuban Revolution and the failure of the Americans to bring down the Castro regime, as we all know. The beginnings of the war in Vietnam, the Vietnam War, this time with American involvement, as opposed to the 1950s when it was French involvement.

The Soviets also lost. They lost, for example, in Indonesia in 1965. Huge country with all that happened there. So, we talk about ups and downs. And there are other examples on both sides.

In the Middle East, we have to deal with changes that took place in Syria and Egypt and the way the Soviet Union treated them. As of the February 23, 1966, Syria is ruled by what’s called the Neo-Ba’ath, which is basically the more radical, militant Ba’ath party of mainly the minorities, and especially Alawis, with names like Hafez al-Assad already as defense minister and commander of the air force, and others. And Egypt is ruled by Abdel Nasser, who lost points because of his failed intervention in the Yemeni Civil War as of 1962.

It wasn’t a failure because the supporters of Nasser lost in this war. It was a failure because Nasser lost in the Arab world because of the use of chemical weapons by the Egyptian army against other Arabs as opposed to the totally peaceful border between Egypt and Israel. So many people in the Arab world said, “You kill Arabs, but Israelis are enjoying total peace along your border.”

So, Nasser was under pressure. The Syrians were very radical, militant, under domestic pressure and trying to cause troubles along the border with Israel over the issue of the Jordan River waters and border incidents as of late 1966. And that’s the point here. The Soviet Union put pressure on both Egypt and Syria to get closer. They signed a defense pact. And that’s something that as of now, so many years later, hasn’t been totally clarified. Even when you look at the Soviet archives that were opened after the collapse of the Soviet Union, there were those in the Kremlin who put pressure on Egypt and Syria to cause troubles with Israel as part of the overall configuration of the Cold War.

May 1967 and Israel’s intelligence failure

Josef Olmert: And here it is: the peaceful border between Israel and Egypt. No problems. The problematic border with Syria. And all of a sudden, as of May 15, 1967, the Egyptian army, in violation of the arrangements after the war of 1956, started to cross from Egypt through the Suez Canal to the Sinai Desert and amass on the borders of Israel.

The Israelis were surprised by it. By the way, an interesting point: Israeli intelligence failed in this instance to read in advance what would happen, which was not the first such failure. In 1960, there was another such failure when Egyptian troops all of a sudden started to amass around the border with Israel without Israelis having any sense of it in advance. That was a crisis that dissipated without any problems. Just to be mentioned only in the context of understanding how intelligence works, and in particular, when we talk about Israel, it’s referring also to what would happen a few years later in the Yom Kippur War. We’ll come to that in 1973. It’s an important point here.

So, the Egyptian army started to amass along the border with Israel. Nasser started to make threatening speeches, calling specifically for a war against Israel — hysteria all over the Arab world. He specifically says he will forbid the movement of Israeli ships from the Straits of Tiran via the Suez Canal — again, in violation of every international law — which in itself is what they call casus belli, a cause for war.

The Israelis are completely surprised and confused. Prime Minister Levi Eshkol at that time — a very nice man and the successor of Ben-Gurion, lacking any charisma — invited the Soviet ambassador to Israel at that time. His name was Chubakhin, and he says to him, “I’ll take you with me right now, without any prior notice, to the Israeli troops on the border with Syria for you to see that there are no Israeli concentrations along the border with Syria. There’s no need for all that.” And Chubakhin said to him, “I don’t care about the facts. We tell you not to provoke troubles with Syria. Period.”

So, you see the connection to the overall bigger picture. The Israelis decided to sound out their Western allies — the partners of the war of ‘56: France and Britain. And then the US. Foreign Minister Abba Eban — not lacking knowledge of foreign languages; he spoke great English, great French; he understood what was said to him. The French and British basically didn’t care. “Okay, do something diplomatic about it.” And then he went to US President LBJ. What exactly he heard from LBJ in this meeting is not so clear. Did he get the specific green light from the Americans to go to war, a preemptive strike against the troops around the borders of Israel? We’ll come to that in a second. Or was it the sense of, “Well, do whatever you have to do. We are out of it, but do whatever you have to do,” — any of this?

At any rate, when he came back to Israel, the sense in Israel was that the US this time would not act like Eisenhower acted in 1956. Call it a mild green light to go to the preemptive strike.

Total victory and strategic realignment

Josef Olmert: In the meantime, King Hussein of Jordan, as we know, joined the Arab coalition under Nasser and put his army under the command of the Egyptians. The Syrian army was along the borders in the north, Jordan in the east, Egypt in the south. It was a violation of international law, the blockade on the Suez Canal and shipping for Israel. The stupid UN Secretary-General at that time, the Burmese U Thant, removed the peace units of the UN from the border because Nasser demanded it from him — again, in total violation of the arrangements of 1956.

Israel had no choice but to go to the war of self-defense under a national unity government with what was, at that time, the Herut–Liberal party, together, that would later become Likud under Menachem Begin. And we know what happened in this war: total victory for Israel and no American pressure, as opposed to ‘56, to stop the war.

Israel was allowed at the time to finish the job completely. Israeli troops on the other side of the Suez Canal; overlooking the Egyptian army on the Egyptian side of the Suez Canal; taking over the West Bank as a result of defending against Jordanian aggression, including the holy city of Jerusalem; liberating the holy city of Jerusalem for the Jewish people and taking over the Golan Heights in the north from the Syrians.

In the context of world politics, this was taken to be a victory for an American ally against the Soviets. And what it did also was, it was the first time, probably, that you were not just getting from Israel, if you are the US, some precious intelligence stuff. Like, say, the Israeli intelligence is the one that told the Americans about the famous Khrushchev speech in the Communist Party Conference in 1956 about Stalin, or other such changes. Israel proved itself to be a credible, potential, possible ally, being a strong military power.

This is the beginning of the relationship with the US to become, later on, the special alliance between the two countries. At the time when France imposed an embargo on Israel, the British washed their hands off. America became now the number one ally of Israel. And that’s the historic turning point.

Let me make a point to start with: This alliance was very, very helpful to Israel. We’ll come to some examples. It was also very helpful to the US. I’ll also give these examples. It was an alliance in many respects. It was clear who was the big brother — the US — and who was the smaller brother — Israel. It was clear.

However, what I want to emphasize here is another important point, because it will also have implications to what would happen much later on, all the way to the days that we are talking about now. Israel developed a dependence on the US, which was much more than just the money-getting, which was important, and the arms-getting, which was extremely important. Everything was: the UN diplomatic support, indeed, was very important — and other international organizations.

The dependence became part of the collective DNA of policymakers in Israel about what Israel could or couldn’t do, should or shouldn’t do. It almost became like a psychological burden. And it became an impediment on many occasions to the Israeli freedom of action on issues which were extremely important to Israel.

Dependence on a superpower is a problem. And I know lots of people say that “the Israelis lobbied the US” — and we’ll come to all that — “so influential.” “America depended on Israel.” “America was really the one that listened to Israel.” In reality, almost every time — not always, but almost every time — after ‘67, when an Israeli government, whether it was still the Labor governments until ‘77 or the Likud governments mostly after ‘77, when they had to make a big, big decision, they referred it first to the US. “What do you think?”

I leave it as an open issue here, I’ll just mention it. Some would say it was a great idea. The great Ben-Gurion went to the war of ‘56 only after he had this alliance with France and Britain. However, in ‘48, he established the state without consulting first with the US or getting their approval.

In 1967 — as I said before, you can argue whether Israel got the green light or not — but Israel went to war with its own independent sovereign decision. Here is an example of what this psychological dependence created. Take the war of ‘73, the Yom Kippur War. It’s still an open issue: How could it happen that Israel was so surprised?

You already heard before an example of how Israel was surprised on other occasions. So let’s leave this one aside. A lot of it had to do with the fact that the US said to Israel, “The Arab armies are a mess, but it’s not going to be a war.” And the Israeli decision was: “There is not going to be a war.” Even when, in the last 24 hours ahead of the beginning of the war, it was already clear there was going to be a war, and the Israelis knew that, they still decided not to preempt because they wanted to make sure that there would be American diplomatic support once the war starts. And that’s a controversial decision. A big decision, a crucial, historic decision. And that refers to what I said about the dependence on the US.

The fact of the matter is, the US, under the policy mostly dictated at that time by Kissinger, we know what was already happening domestically in the US: the Watergate scandal and all that, which weakened President Nixon as a president. But Kissinger was the architect, spokesperson and executor of American foreign policy. He was part of those who put pressure on Israel not to finalize the war by totally defeating the Egyptian army, when the Third Egyptian Army was already besieged by the Israelis.

Maybe a great, positive decision, because it could have helped later on President Sadat to come to the idea of making peace with Israel. Because he could argue that the war of ‘73 was a partial or full victory for Egypt, not a total defeat as it could have been if the Israelis were allowed to continue the siege over the Egyptian Army — the Third Army, as they called it — and totally destroy it, as was so easy for them to do at the time when the war was stopped.

The costs of dependence

Josef Olmert: But there are other examples on either side of the spectrum here: how the Israelis made big decisions without consulting with the US, how they did it only because of consulting with the US. But altogether, it became almost like a dictum in Israeli foreign policy and security policy: “Can we or can we not do it because of what America will say or do?”

And that’s how I leave it here. That’s a factor. To say it was wrong or it was right is wrong because it depends on so many other examples, and it depends on the specific situation that we talked about.

So, this alliance as of ‘67 had so many components. The financial support to Israel was fantastically significant, even though as of 2006 — and many people don’t know it — the civilian aid stopped. It’s only military aid. And of the money that Israel gets as military aid, 75% of it goes back to shopping in the US, which means that the net aid to Israel is only 25% of the $3 or $4 billion a year. But still, it’s important. And I’m not saying what I’m saying now in order to belittle it; I’m just putting it in context. Absolute support — almost — in international organizations, including the veto power on anti-Israel decisions in the UN Security Council — that was very significant.

Support for Israel in times of domestic issues. For example, the big financial economic crisis of the early 1980s with the hyperinflation in Israel at that time as a result of the economic policies of the Begin government, and his late finance minister, Yoram Aridor. The so-called dollarization plan and all that. These had a lot of American support.

It was clear that America considered Israel to be a great ally even though it still had Arab allies. Saudi Arabia continues to be, as of the Camp David Accords of 1979. Egypt is becoming part of the triangle of the main allies of the US in the Middle East: Egypt on one end, Saudi Arabia and Israel in the middle. There was a lot of support.

I can go on and on and on. And two elements which were very, very significant in this support were the bipartisan support, which most Israeli governments cared very carefully to maintain — the support of both parties. That was very significant. We’ll see more of it in the next episode. And the rise of the American Jewish community as a major block of support to Israel, which was not as strong in the 1940s or even the 1950s, but became much stronger in the late 1960s and early 1970s, with regard to the struggle for Soviet Jewry, and supporting Congress on the level of the different states in the US.

Israel was helpful to the US on various occasions. Take, for example, the crisis in Jordan, 1970 — Black September, when the Syrian army invaded Jordan and Israel forced them out. Something that was in Israeli interest, but significantly in American interest. Israel in that case was doing something that was in the service of the entire Western world. Not for nothing — Joe Biden of all people said on one occasion that Israel is like another aircraft carrier for the US. That’s an interesting statement that he made before he was president.

We have to remember that Israel helped the US with regard to the situation in Iran before the revolution by providing intelligence that was precious but was ignored by the US. Israel helped the US before the Saddam invasion of Kuwait in 1990. I can tell you something that very few people are aware of: A high-level Israeli delegation, in the middle of July, flew especially urgently to the US to caution them about what could happen. And the US said, “We don’t know.” They should have known. So, they sent the unfortunate ambassador, April Glaspie, in Baghdad, to talk with Saddam Hussein on July 28. And we know what happened there. Saddam Hussein promptly said, “Nothing would happen.” That was July 28, 1994. Four days later, on August 2, the invasion started.

Israel agreed not to retaliate to Saddam sending 42 missiles to Israel during the Gulf War of ‘91. It’s part of the alliance with the US. Because the US did not want it to be an Arab–Israeli war if Israel was to react, as opposed to a war of the US with an Arab coalition — including even Syria — against Saddam Hussein.

And we can go on and on like this. The balance sheet is, in this alliance, Israel benefited enormously. There’s no question about it. What the alliance did to the overall decision-making process in Israel is also something that we should have mentioned — and I did — and we have to bear it in mind. In a way, it made Israeli policymakers somewhat complacent in making some crucial decisions — realizing, and on some occasions mistakenly, that the alliance with the US would do the job for Israel.

There are two approaches here, in general terms, from an Israeli perspective, about how to handle all this. Should we trust only ourselves, always and absolutely so? Is it even possible? Or should we measurably trust a great ally? And what’s in between these two approaches?

Cracks in the alliance

Josef Olmert: Our next episode will be about the emerging of forces within the alliance, both in the US and in Israel, that — I’ll already say now — were to weaken it in a gradual but systematic way that was not always recognized, definitely not in Israel as such. And that will lead us to the fourth episode, which will be the current situation with Donald Trump.

See you next time.

[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.