Creating Frankenstein: The Saudi Export of Wahhabism
For Saudi Arabia, the chicken is coming home to roost.
The Saudi export and global support for religiously driven groups goes far beyond Wahhabism—its own puritan interpretation of Islam—and is not simply a product of the Faustian bargain that the ruling Saud family made with the Wahhabis.
The support of puritan, intolerant, non-pluralistic and discriminatory forms of ultra-conservatism—primarily Wahhabism, Salafism in its various stripes and Deobandism in South Asia and the South Asian diaspora—is central to Saudi Arabia’s efforts to position itself internationally and flex its muscles regionally, and has been crucial to the Saud family’s survival strategy for at least the last four decades.
For the Saudi government, it is about soft power and countering Iran in, what is for the Saud family, an existential battle rather than religious proselytization.
Saudi Arabia’s focus on ultra-conservatism, rather than only Wahhabism or quietist forms of Salafism, allowed the kingdom to not simply rely on the export of its specific interpretation of Islam, but also to capitalize on existing, longstanding similar worldviews, particularly in South Asia. South Asia is also where the Saudi effort that amounts to the single largest dedicated public diplomacy campaign in post-World War II history—bigger than anything the Soviet Union or the United States attempted—had its most devastating effect.
The scope of the Saudi campaign goes far beyond religious groups because it is about soft power and geopolitics and not just proselytization. It involved the funding of constructing mosques and cultural institutions; networks of schools, universities, and book and media outlets; and the distribution of not only Wahhabi literature in multiple languages, but also of works of ultra-conservative scholars of other stripes.
It also involved forging close ties, particularly in Muslim-majority countries, with various branches of government, including militaries, intelligence agencies and ministries of education, and interior and religious affairs to ensure that—especially when it came to Iran as well as Muslim-minority communities like the Ahmadis and Shias—Saudi Arabia’s worldview was well-represented.
An example of this is Indonesia where Asad Ali, the recently retired deputy head of Indonesian intelligence and former deputy head of Nahdlatul Ulema (NU)—one of the world’s largest Islamic movements that prides itself on its anti-Wahhabism—professes in the same breath his dislike of the Wahhabis and warns that Shia Muslims are one of the foremost domestic threats to Indonesian national security. Shias constitute 1.2% of the Indonesian population, including the estimated 2 million Sunni Muslim converts over the last 40 years.
A fluent Arabic speaker who spent years in Saudi Arabia as the representative of Indonesian intelligence, this intelligence and religious official is not instinctively anti-Shia, but sees Shias as an Iranian fifth wheel. In other words, the impact of Saudi funding and ultra-conservatism is such that even NU is forced to adopt ultra-conservative language and concepts when it comes to perceptions of the threat posed by Iran and Shia Muslims.
In waging its campaign, Saudi Arabia was not alone. It benefitted from governments that were eager to benefit from Saudi largesse, and were willing to use religion opportunistically to further their own interests, that cooperated with the kingdom wholeheartedly to the ultimate detriment of their societies.
Much of Saudi funding in the last half century, despite the more recent new assertiveness in the kingdom’s foreign and defense policy, was directed at non-violent, ultra-conservative groups and institutions as well as governments. It created environments that did not breed violence in and of themselves, but in given circumstances greater militancy and radicalism. Pakistan is probably the one exception, where a more direct comparison to Russian and communist support of liberation movements and insurgencies in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s is most relevant.
In many ways, the chicken is coming home to roost.
The structure of the Saudi funding campaign was such that the Saudis ultimately unleashed a genie they did not and were not able to control, and that no longer can be put back into the bottle. The genie has since often turned against them, particularly with a host of—albeit not all—militant Islamist and jihadist groups that view Saudis having deviated from the true path.
The Saudi government, to bolster its campaign, created various institutions including the Muslim World League and its multiple subsidiaries; Al Haramain, another charity that following 9/11 was disbanded because of its militant links; and the likes of the Islamic universities in Medina, Pakistan and Malaysia. In virtually all of these instances, the Saudis were the funders. The executors were others—often with agendas of their own such as the Muslim Brotherhood with the Muslim World League or in the case of Al Haramain, more militant Islamists if not jihadists.
Saudi oversight was non-existent and the laissez-faire attitude started at the top. Saudis seldom figure in the management or oversight of institutions they fund outside of the kingdom—the International Islamic University of Islamabad being an exception.
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This lack of oversight was evident in the National Commercial Bank (NCB) when it was Saudi Arabia’s largest financial institution. The NCB had a department of numbered accounts. These were all accounts belonging to members of the ruling family. Only three people had access to those accounts—one of them was the majority owner of the bank, Khalid bin Mahfouz. Bin Mahfouz would get a phone call from a senior member of the family who would instruct him to transfer money to a specific country, leaving it up to bin Mahfouz where precisely that money would go.
In one instance, bin Mahfouz was instructed by Prince Sultan, the then-defense minister, to wire $5 million to Bosnia Herzegovina. Prince Sultan did not indicate the beneficiary. Bin Mahfouz sent the money to a charity in Bosnia that, in the wake of 9/11, was raided by US law enforcement and Bosnian security agents. The hard disks of the foundation revealed the degree to which the institution was controlled by jihadists.
At one point, the Saudis suspected one of the foundation’s operatives of being a member of Egypt’s Islamic Jihad. They sent someone to Sarajevo to investigate. The investigator confronted the man, saying: “We hear that you have these connections and if that is true we need to part ways.” The man put his hand on his heart and denied the allegation. As far as the Saudis were concerned, the issue was settled until the man appeared later in court and described how easy it had been to fool the Saudis.
The Impact on Pakistan
The impact and fallout of the Saudi campaign is greater intolerance toward ethnic, religious and sexual minorities, increased sectarianism and a pushback against traditional as well as modern cultural expressions in countries like Pakistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mali and Bosnia Herzegovina.
It creates a wasteland that Saadat Hasan Manto, a Muslim journalist, Indian film screenwriter and South Asia’s foremost author of short stories, envisioned in as early as 1954 in an essay, “By the Grace of Allah.” Manto described a Pakistan in which everything—music and art, literature and poetry—was censored:
“There were clubs where people gambled and drank. There were dance houses, cinema houses, art galleries and God knows what other places full of sin … But now by the grace of God, gentlemen, one neither sees a poet or a musician … Thank God we are now rid of these satanic people. The people had been led astray. They were demanding their undue rights. Under the aegis of an atheist flag they wanted to topple the government. By the grace of God, not a single one of those people is amongst us today. Thank goodness a million times that we are ruled by mullahs and we present sweets to them every Thursday … By the grace of God, our world is now cleansed of this chaos. People eat, pray and sleep.”
The fallout of Saudi- and government-backed ultra-conservatism has been, perhaps, the most devastating in Pakistan. There are a variety of reasons for this, including:
1) The fact that Pakistan was founded as a Muslim state rather than a state populated by a majority of Muslims;
2) The resulting intimate relationship between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia that, long before the Afghan jihad against the Soviets in the 1980s, led to constitutional amendments against the Ahmadis and every Pakistani applying for a passport being forced to effectively sign an anti-Ahmadi oath;
3) The devastating impact of the jihad itself on Pakistan; and
4) Pakistan’s use of militant Islamist and jihadist groups to further its geopolitical objectives.
To be sure, the Saudi campaign neatly aligned itself with the manipulation of religiously-inspired groups by governments, as well as the US to counter left-wing, communist and nationalist forces over the decades.
Pakistan had, however, from the Saudi perspective an additional significance. It borders Iran and is home to the world’s largest Shia minority that accounts for roughly a quarter of Pakistan’s 200 million people.
The result is that with the exception today of Syria and Iraq and Bosnia in the 1990s, Pakistan is the only country where Saudi funding strayed beyond support for non-violent groups.
In Pakistan, the Saudis were at the birth of violent groups that served their geopolitical purposes, many of which have theoretically been banned but continue to operate openly with Saudi and government support—groups whose impact is felt far and wide. These groups often have senior members that were resident in Mecca for many years and who raised funds and coordinated with branches of the Saudi government.
The usefulness of the Saudi campaign may after decades be coming to an end, even if its sectarian aspects remain crucial in the kingdom’s struggle with Iran for regional hegemony. Nonetheless, the cost/benefit analysis from a Saudi government perspective is beginning to shift. Not only because of the consequences of ultra-conservatism having been woven into the fabric of Pakistani society and government to a degree that would take at least a generation to reverse, and that threatens to destabilize the country and region.
But also because the identification of Saudi-backed ultra-conservatism with jihadists like the Islamic State (IS) has made the very ideology that legitimizes the rule of the Saud family a target witness for debates in countries like the Netherlands and France about banning Salafism. Bans will obviously not solve the jihadist problem, but as Saudi-backed ultra-conservatism is increasingly in the crosshairs, efforts to enhance Saudi soft power will increasingly be undermined.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
Photo Credit: Sivakumar Sathiamoorthy
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