African violence and conflict have increased over the last decade, posing significant challenges to countries inside and outside the Sahel region — a region stretching horizontally south of the Sahara desert. Abuses by various jihadist groups, local militias and paramilitary organizations are rising rapidly. Despite the promises of Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso’s military governments to subdue the decade-long conflict with jihadist groups, the bloodshed has only intensified. Since 2022, the tenth anniversary of the beginning of the jihadist-led insurgencies, a series of political and security tensions have reconfigurated the balance of power and international alliances throughout the Sahel.

The extremist groups threaten to exacerbate the humanitarian crisis and spread instability across Africa. This is terrible for Africa and poses significant security and financial risks for the United States and Europe as well. Of the over three million refugees and internally displaced people in the Sahel, one in five needs humanitarian assistance. That’s around 16,000 victims in 2022 and 19,000 in 2023. Indeed, this conflict has taken a heavy toll.

This escalation of violence is mainly linked to competition between the region’s two main jihadist groups: Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State in the West African Province (ISWAP), which are affiliated with al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, respectively. Jointly with other groups, they have taken advantage of the great instability in the region to launch indiscriminate attacks on government forces and civilians.

Coups and rebellions escalate the violence

Experts attribute the expansion of violent extremism in the Sahel to weak governance, high corruption, democratic deficits and human rights violations combined with poverty and social marginalization. State power tends to be concentrated in urban regions while rural and northern areas, such as Mali, remain underdeveloped and ripe for exploitation by extremist groups. Simultaneously, the jihadist collective has sought to exploit the increase in violence across the central Sahel, positioning itself as the defender of local communities and obtaining their support.

Moreover, Chad, Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania and Niger experienced many military coups since independence. Recent military coups in Mali in 2020 and 2021, Burkina Faso in 2022 and Niger in 2023 have redefined the political landscape.

Current instability is associated with the collapse of the Libyan state in 2011, which led to the proliferation of weapons and armed fighters in the region. In 2012, the influx of extremists into northern Mali reignited the dormant Tuareg rebellion — the Tuareg minority, organized under the Azawad National Liberation Movement, sought an autonomous state and aligned with multiple Islamist groups.

On September 17, 2024, Islamist armed fighters attacked two symbolic sites for the security in the Malian capital of Bamako: a gendarmerie school and a military base, causing about 77 casualties and hundreds injured. JNIM, the main jihadist group active in Mali, quickly claimed responsibility for the double attack. This follows a pattern of escalating violent incidents in the Bamako area in the past two years by the JNIM coalition, primarily the Macina Liberation Front.

This growing pressure on Bamako reflects a broader deterioration of security in Mali under the military junta. Recently, militant Islamist groups have demonstrated an increased ability to expand their reach into southern Mali from their fortifications in northern and central Mali. The Malian government intends to maintain operations against the jihadists.

Do these attacks mark a turning point in the jihadists’ strategy? This is not an easy question to answer. The scale and impact of the September 27 operation show that JNIM now has the capacity not only to strike secondary urban sites, but to shake up the Malian forces in Bamako by expanding military operations to the state’s center.

Western withdrawal from the Sahel

This instability has had a major effect at the international level. In 2022, the definitive breakdown of diplomatic relations between France and Mali prompted French President Emmanuel Macron to announce the withdrawal of French troops from Malian territory. That November, the French military mission Opération Barkhane, which had deployed in the Sahel since August 2014, officially concluded. This profound revision of the region’s French military apparatus is in turn causing a crisis for the entire security framework built by the international community over the last decade.

The US has also provided coordination and advisory support. The US military has increased its presence in the Sahel in the last decade, deploying approximately 1,500 troops to the region — particularly Niger. However, after making an agreement with a Nigerien military junta in May 2024, the US withdrew from Niger in September.

In June 2023, Mali’s government demanded the departure of the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, the UN peacekeeping force. The UN agreed to withdraw within six months, doing so in December 2023. This development raised concerns of a power vacuum and setbacks for Mali’s transition to civilian rule.

The July 2023 coup in Niger dealt a severe blow to counterterrorism and stabilization efforts in the Sahel. Despite pressure from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), including sanctions and the threat of military intervention, the coup leaders refused to cede power and declared a new government. In response, the African Union suspended Niger.

However, some of the sanctions were recently lifted or eased as ECOWAS pushed for a new dialogue. Military regimes in Guinea, Burkina Faso and Mali have backed the Nigerien junta, with the latter two considering a possible military intervention in Niger to be a “declaration of war.” In September 2023, the military leaders of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger signed a mutual defense pact — the Alliance of Sahel States — solidifying, in recent months, their alliance against external intervention.

Russian movement into Africa

This “authoritarian epidemic,” which the Italian Institute for International Political Studies characterizes by the seizure of power by the military, is mainly due to the persistence of the security crisis. This has delegitimized civilian governments that are demonstrably incapable of responding to growing security pressures. Jihadist escalation and the authoritarian and nationalist drift of local governments have finally created the ideal conditions for an influential increase of other international actors in the region, starting with Russia. These military regimes have strengthened ties with the Asian power, which has moved in to fill the void.

The most obvious element of this Russian entry is the presence of mercenaries belonging to the private security company Wagner. The government in Bamako uses them to conduct counterinsurgency operations increasingly characterized by indiscriminate brutality committed against civilians.

Russia’s “African renaissance” seems able to increase, based on an economic and military diplomacy that exploits anti-French and anti-Western sentiments. It seduces part of the African elite, attracts old and new partners, winks at coup-plotting juntas and has supplanted France as the gendarme of countries in turmoil in its historic pré carré — “own little corner.” Russia’s representation is that of a just ally eager to create egalitarian ties with African countries, capable of emancipating them from the relationship with European powers. The opposition to “imperialism” present in Russian rhetoric creates further common ground between the country and the Sahelian military juntas.

The presence of the Wagner group, and now of the Russian Africa Corps, initially called to operate against the jihadists, now has the function of supporting the coup juntas. The numerous internal and external actors involved in this conflict, as well as the competition between global powers to increase their influence in Africa, make finding a solution extremely difficult.

In this framework, Ukraine’s involvement in the crisis is experiencing an increasingly pronounced setback. In August 2024, the three Sahelian military juntas wrote to the United Nations Security Council to allegedly denounce Kyiv’s intervention in Mali to support Tuareg rebellion. After Mali and Niger broke diplomatic relations with Ukraine, the Asian country received yet more confirmation that its image had been damaged: Andriy Yusov, the spokesperson for the Ukrainian military intelligence services, said Kyiv had provided information for the JNIM and Tuareg rebels’ attack on the Malian army.

Learning that Ukraine is collaborating with its enemies, purely in an anti-Russian function, has raised concerns even outside the Sahel. Despite being amid a diplomatic crisis with the three coup juntas, ECOWAS has spoken out against any form of foreign interference.

Excessive militarization has proven counterproductive. In fact, local populations affected by repeated human rights violations have lost all confidence in international intervention as well as in international institutions.

The French era seems to have passed in what was once its African “backyard,” substituted by the Africa Corps that serves as the engine of Russian military penetration in Africa. The geopolitical revolution engulfing the Global South is redrawing global spheres of influence. Will this lead to a strategic downgrading of the West?

[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.