Chinese declared: “We’ve now reached the point where the FBI is opening a new -related counterintelligence case about every 10 hours. Of the nearly 5,000 active FBI counterintelligence cases currently underway across the country, almost half are all related to .”cases in the have assumed alarming proportions. On July 7, Christopher Wray, the director of the Federal ,
Does Beijing Prefer Biden or Trump?
Since the mid-1990s, evidence of Chinesein the had been mounting. However, it is only recently that the began taking this issue seriously. Washington’s inability to recognize the threat from early on is due to its failure to understand Chinese culture. This, in turn, is because the lacks a strategic counterintelligence culture and focuses excessively on operations.
Historical Roots of Chinese Espionage Culture
Americans see the worsening of Sino-US relations from the prism of “betrayal” and “surprise.” This is because the considers the 1972 US- rapprochement as a watershed moment. Many in Washington believe the was singularly responsible for the dramatic economic rise of . Consequently, they had assumed that the Middle Kingdom would be grateful for American help and adopt norms over time. To their surprise, this did not happen. never really displayed gratitude and it has become increasingly defiant as it has become more powerful. The rising threat of , both security and commercial, is just one of the many manifestations of this defiance.
A simple question arises: Why did the academics who understood the perils of neglecting foreign cultures. Their advice went unheeded, though.fail to foresee the threat of by ? The answer lies in the chronic inability of and intelligentsia to pay adequate attention to the intelligence cultures of other countries. As early as the 1980s, this lacuna had been pointed out by some
To understand Jesuit missionaries to the village of Shanghai. In a way, these missionaries were the first Western intelligence operatives in . They came with the mission of converting the to Christianity. The Jesuits assumed that the lure of superior Western science and technology would convince the to embrace Christianity. This didn’t happen. By the end of the 19th century, the Jesuits concluded that their mission had been a “total failure.”intelligence culture, the operative date is not 1972 but the first recorded interaction between the and civilizations. In the 16th century, Italian-born Father Matteo Ricci led a team of
The reason behind this failure is fairly straightforward. Hostility toward foreigners was deeply entrenched in the categorized as “inferior” and “barbaric.” The missionaries were only welcome as long as they imparted knowledge in the scientific and technological realms. Beyond that, when they tried to propagate religion and philosophy, they were punished and sometimes executed. In essence, the saw the missionaries akin to a fat cow that was to be milked and then slaughtered. This episode offers important insights for understanding modern culture.psyche. Any foreigner was
Today,is again milking the West for advanced scientific and technical knowledge. This time, it has sent to infiltrate citadels of knowledge, especially in the .
Reassessing Chinese Espionage Operations
Studies on Chinese intelligence have mostly focused on operational level analysis. Analysts have largely failed to place individualoperations within the cultural context. Few Americans understand that the principles guiding Chinese operations are fundamentally at odds with western ones.
This difference could be spotted as early as the mid-20th century when the influence of Soviet intelligence practices on the Chinese remained minimal.Party ( ) was building up its intelligence infrastructure with the help of the Soviet Union. Subsequently, the intelligence apparatus cooperated closely with Soviet intelligence. Yet, despite tutelage and operational cooperation, the
Just as 16th century China had welcomed Western science and discarded Western philosophy, the true to Sun Tzu, the famous military strategist of the 6thcentury BCE. There was “no imitation or even emulation” of Soviet intelligence practices, but only “customization and improvisation.”followed the same practice. Operationally, the CCP were keen to learn the tricks of the trade from the Soviets. However, they stuck with their ancient philosophies on the subject. In particular, the stayed
One such customization can be seen in how the expendable spies,” which conflicts with the Western philosophy of “ethical spying.” Empirical studies on the British, American and Soviet experience in running human intelligence operations reveal a remarkable degree of concern for field agents. In particular, Western have historically shown great regard for the lives and security of their informers. The Americans and the British treated Russian informers like Adolf Tolkachev and Oleg Gordievsky rather well. The Soviets also took good care of strategic informants like the Cambridge Five. Western handling officers often insist on “informant security.”have employed the Sun Tzuvian concept of “
The “expendable spies” doctrine, on the other hand, does not extend to the field agents the privileges that come with “ethical Candace Claiborne, the State Department official, illustrates this point. Claiborne’s true identity was revealed when she unsuspectingly accepted a compliment from an undercover operative that she was one of the “highest regarded” assets of the Ministry of State Security (MSS), the intelligence, security and secret police agency of . This incident reveals that Chinese intelligence seems to have offered zero security training to an agent who enjoyed top-secret clearance. The CCP treats agents as “disposable” because it still follows Sun Tzu’s theory of “expendable spies.”.” The arrest of
The expendable and ethical schools of intelligence lead to a qualitative versus quantitative dichotomy when it comes to informer networks. historical origins that date back to the formative years of the CCP intelligence apparatus.agencies look for a few reliable informers who can be secured. The Chinese employ a vacuum cleaner approach and prefer using a large number of intelligence collectors instead of a few trained professionals. This qualitative-quantitative distinction is certainly well known, but few Americans appreciate its
insisted to his Chinese counterpart that they discuss this thorny issue. After a few failed attempts at dodging it, the Chinese official made a rather candid observation. According to the official, the Chinese intelligence culture did not distinguish between espionage for and for economics. Such a dichotomy was solely a Western one. For the Chinese, it did not exist. Despite this clear confession, it took another five years for the American establishment to completely wake up to the reality of the Chinese threat.has used the quantitative approach relentlessly when it comes to commercial espionage. In 2015, John Lewis of the Obama administration
Fixing the American Culture of Counterintelligence
The US can contain the Chinese threat by effective counterintelligence. However, the current state of play does not inspire much confidence. American misreading of Chinese espionage culture has given birth to an inadequate counterintelligence response. The US focuses too much on individual cases and not enough on developing a strategic counterintelligence doctrine.
In such a strategy, the US would employ offensive operations to disrupt enemy intelligence goals. Instead, the FBI currently deploys a defensive strategy that involves the prosecution and conviction of foreign agents. This has two obvious flaws.
First, prosecution takes up scarce time, energy and money. It has an opportunity cost. It fails to exploit a compromised spy who could be used as a double agent. Prosecution also alerts enemy intelligence agencies who can then cover up their tracks.
Second, convictions are hard to obtain in intelligence matters. Evidence is often insufficient, critical details of operations cannot be revealed and the gray matters of espionage do not translate as easily to the cut and dried approach of the court of law. This makes convictions difficult to secure. In fact, the shrinking arrest-to-conviction ratio feeds into the Chinese intelligence offensive, which feeds on accusations of racism and witch-hunting by the Americans. Every person accused by the FBI who walks away free adds to China’s psychological operations (PSYOP).
In theory, PSYOP is shaped and targeted at a particular set of audiences to achieve a well-defined set of objectives. By accusing Americans of racism, the CCP aims to appeal to the sentiments of the American people in order to turn them against the FBI. In this regard, Beijing seems successful as American academic and scientific institutions have repeatedly resisted the FBI’s requests to monitor Chinese students. These institutions fear accusations of racism and perhaps a drying up of Chinese money. China has cleverly created rifts between American security agencies and its intellectual institutions to further its own purposes.
To extricate American counterintelligence from this imbroglio, the US will have to embrace a strategic counterintelligence doctrine. It will have to use PSYOP effectively too. In particular, it could focus on China’s violations of human rights such as the brutal “traitor weeding” program followed by its intelligence agencies. Already, educated Americans are turning against Chinese actions in Xinjiang, Hong Kong and Tibet.
Therefore, the need of the hour is for Americans to embrace the famed Sun Tzuvian dictum: “[K]now thyself and know thy enemy; a thousand battles, a thousand victories.”
*[Atul Singh provided guidance for this article.]
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
For more than 10 years, Fair Observer has been free, fair and independent. No billionaire owns us, no advertisers control us. We are a reader-supported nonprofit. Unlike many other publications, we keep our content free for readers regardless of where they live or whether they can afford to pay. We have no paywalls and no ads.
In the post-truth era of fake news, echo chambers and filter bubbles, we publish a plurality of perspectives from around the world. Anyone can publish with us, but everyone goes through a rigorous editorial process. So, you get fact-checked, well-reasoned content instead of noise.
We publish 2,500+ voices from 90+ countries. We also conduct education and training programs on subjects ranging from digital media and journalism to writing and critical thinking. This doesn’t come cheap. Servers, editors, trainers and web developers cost money. Please consider supporting us on a regular basis as a recurring donor or a sustaining member.