Fair Observer’s Video Producer Rohan Khattar Singh speaks with Saya Kiba, a professor at Japan’s Kobe City University of Foreign Studies, about a sudden diplomatic flare-up between Japan and China. The controversy follows remarks by Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi on Taiwan and Japan’s security laws, comments that Beijing accused of crossing a red line. Their conversation unpacks what Takaichi actually said, why China reacted so strongly and how Taiwan interpreted the moment. What does it mean for Japan–China relations going forward?

What Takaichi said

Kiba begins by clarifying that the dispute centers on how Japan interprets its Armed Attack Situation Response Act, the legal framework governing deployment of the Self-Defense Forces. The law distinguishes between a direct armed attack on Japan and a more ambiguous category known as a “survival-threatening situation,” defined as an attack on a foreign country in a close relationship with Japan that endangers Japan’s survival and its people’s fundamental rights.

That vagueness is deliberate. Japan’s government has long kept the concept strategically ambiguous. What is not ambiguous, however, is which country qualifies as being in a “close relationship” with Japan: the United States, due to the bilateral security alliance.

Taiwan does not fall into this category. Japan formally recognizes the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as the sole legal government of China and respects Beijing’s One China principle. As a result, Japan would never deploy forces to defend Taiwan directly. The legal opening exists only if the US were attacked in or around the Taiwan Strait, in which case Japan might consider collective defense in support of its ally.

The controversy erupted during a November 7 parliamentary hearing, when opposition lawmaker Katsuya Okada pressed Takaichi to clarify what would constitute a survival-threatening situation. Instead of sticking to abstraction, she offered a highly concrete example involving Taiwan, US warships and the possibility of Japanese support.

Kiba notes that while Takaichi’s explanation did not formally violate existing policy, it went further than previous prime ministers had dared. “Her statement was just too much,” Kiba says, emphasizing that Takaichi’s specificity appeared to brush aside the careful legal and political balancing underpinning Japan’s strategic ambiguity. Still, there has been no change in policy. Any declaration of a survival-threatening situation would require cabinet deliberation and approval by the Diet.

Will Japan defend Taiwan?

Kiba stresses that Japan will not defend Taiwan as Taiwan. That legal reality is well understood among Taiwanese policymakers and intellectuals, who recognize that Japan’s position remains anchored in respect for the One China principle. From that perspective, Takaichi’s comments were not shocking.

Public opinion in Taiwan tells a different story. A 2022 survey by the Taiwanese Public Opinion Foundation showed that 43% of respondents believed Japan would send troops to defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese attack — a higher share than those who expected US intervention. Kiba is blunt about this gap between expectation and reality, calling it “very wrong.” The episode underscores the need for clearer public diplomacy, not only toward Taiwan but toward the international community more broadly.

China’s anger

Beijing’s reaction was immediate and unusually sharp. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi accused Japan of crossing a red line, language that reflects how Taiwan sits at the center of China’s primary interest. From Beijing’s standpoint, silence was never an option.

Kiba situates the reaction within the framework of the 1972 Japan–China Joint Communiqué, which normalized relations. In that document, Japan recognizes the PRC as the sole legal government of China — a deliberately strong formulation — and states that it “fully understands and respects” China’s position that Taiwan is an inalienable part of its territory. That language has not changed since 1972. Whatever confusion Takaichi’s remarks created, they did not alter the legal foundation of Japan–China relations.

China’s sensitivity is heightened by how it perceives Takaichi personally. Even before becoming prime minister, she was viewed in Beijing as an assertive, conservative figure: a self-declared successor to former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, outspokenly critical of China and committed to expanding Japan’s defense capabilities. Although she ultimately decided not to visit the Yasukuni Shrine — which to many represents Japanese nationalism and honors perpetrators of humanitarian crimes in World War II — after taking office, China continues to watch her closely.

What next for Japan–China relations?

Looking ahead, Kiba identifies the safety of nationals as a persistent and underappreciated flashpoint. Japan remains deeply concerned about the security of its citizens in China, recalling past incidents involving workers detained since 2014 and the 2024 killing of a Japanese schoolboy by Chinese resident Zhong Changchun. Simultaneously, Kiba acknowledges that Chinese citizens in Japan worry about hate crimes and discrimination during periods of political tension.

Kiba ends on a cautious but humane note, expressing hope that public sentiment on both sides remains calm and that geopolitical disputes do not spill into violence against civilians. Strategic ambiguity may define Japan’s security posture, but diplomatic and social restraint will shape whether future frictions escalate or fade.

[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.