Editor-in-Chief Atul Singh speaks with eminent scholar Ishtiaq Ahmed and Professor Thomas Barfield about the historical roots of tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan. They trace the origins of the Durand Line dispute, examine why Pakistan’s long-standing strategy toward Afghanistan has repeatedly failed and consider how history, ethnicity and economics continue to shape relations between the two neighbors. Looking ahead, they argue that only greater regional cooperation and a more flexible political approach can prevent recurring instability.

Pakistan’s strategic depth strategy reaches a dead end

Singh opens by asking why relations between Pakistan and Taliban-led Afghanistan have deteriorated despite Islamabad’s decades-long support for the Taliban movement. Ahmed explains that Pakistan expected the US withdrawal to restore its policy of securing “strategic depth” through a friendly government in Kabul. Instead, the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan has intensified attacks against the Pakistani state, while the Taliban government has expanded ties with India, Pakistan’s principal regional rival.

Pakistan further poisoned relations by deporting roughly two million Afghans. Ahmed argues that these expulsions have created deep resentment that now fuels cross-border violence. Rather than producing a more cooperative neighbor, Islamabad’s policies have reinforced Afghan distrust while weakening the influence Pakistan once believed it possessed.

Barfield adds that this outcome reflects a long-standing historical pattern. Afghan groups that relied on Pakistan during insurgencies consistently embraced Afghan nationalism once they assumed power in Kabul. As he observes, “Not Mullah Omar, not the current Taliban, not the republic ever recognized the Durand Line.”

A disputed border with deep historical roots

Ahmed traces today’s tensions back to the 1893 Durand Line and the partition of British India in 1947. Afghanistan became the only country to oppose Pakistan’s admission to the United Nations because Kabul believed the Pashtuns should have been offered the option of independence or union with Afghanistan rather than only India or Pakistan.

He also reviews later political developments that alienated many Pashtuns. Although the referendum in the Northwest Frontier Province favored Pakistan, turnout remained limited after a boycott by Pashtun leaders. Subsequent dismissals of elected provincial governments further deepened mistrust between Islamabad and the frontier regions.

Barfield emphasizes that the Durand Line itself was never intended by the British to function as a conventional international border. Instead, it separated spheres of influence while allowing communities on both sides to maintain longstanding economic and family ties. The emergence of modern nation-states attempted to impose rigid borders on societies that had historically moved freely across the frontier.

Nationalism consistently outweighs client politics

Ahmed and Barfield argue that Pakistan’s effort to treat Afghanistan as a dependent client has repeatedly failed because Afghan nationalism ultimately overrides external influence. Although Pakistan invested heavily in supporting successive Afghan insurgencies, every government that emerged in Kabul rejected Islamabad’s expectations once it exercised sovereign authority.

Barfield notes that Pakistan’s leverage has also diminished because Afghanistan now possesses alternative trade routes. India’s support for Iran’s Chabahar Port has reduced Afghanistan’s dependence on Pakistani transit, limiting Islamabad’s economic influence. Simultaneously, deporting Afghans who spent decades living in Pakistan has created an entire generation with bitter memories of expulsion.

The speakers also explore historical perceptions that continue to shape politics. Ahmed reflects on longstanding Punjabi fears of Afghan invasions, rooted in centuries of conflict across the frontier. Barfield says these historical narratives still influence modern policymaking even when political realities have changed.

Afghanistan’s greatest challenge may be economic

While security dominates headlines, Barfield believes Afghanistan’s most immediate problem is economic sustainability. During the insurgency, the Taliban relied on the previous government to continue paying civil servants and providing public services in areas under Taliban control. Once they assumed full power, however, international assistance largely disappeared.

Barfield says the Taliban “entered an empty store and declared it theirs.” Governing has proven far more difficult than fighting because Afghanistan has historically depended on outside funding rather than domestic taxation. With aid reduced and regional trade disrupted, sustaining the current government has grown increasingly difficult.

Ahmed agrees that Afghanistan has long relied on external resources, whether through foreign subsidies or broader regional relationships. Both conclude that any Afghan government faces severe constraints unless it secures stable sources of revenue beyond military success.

Flexibility offers the best path forward

Looking ahead, Singh asks whether violence is likely to continue. Ahmed states that Pakistan remains militarily stronger than Afghanistan, making outright territorial change unlikely. However, he doubts military superiority alone can resolve the political grievances that drive unrest across the frontier.

Barfield instead advocates abandoning maximalist demands over formal recognition of the Durand Line. He argues that both countries would benefit from accepting practical cooperation while allowing disagreement over historical claims to remain unresolved. Economic integration, rather than rigid legal positions, offers the best chance of reducing tensions.

Drawing on the European Union as an example, Barfield suggests that expanding trade and shared economic interests can gradually create incentives for political compromise. The discussion concludes that Pakistan’s internal diversity also requires greater decentralization and flexibility. Unless Islamabad adapts its approach toward both Afghanistan and its own regions, instability along the frontier is likely to persist.

[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.