The Yemeni transitional government and the new President Hadi must take this small window of opportunity to address the various challenges Yemen faces.

In an unprecedented voter turnout of 65%, the majority of Yemenis have selected Abdo Rabbo Mansour Hadi as their new president despite their recognition of the flawed and undemocratic manner of his election. The motives behind the votes and the boycott varied significantly, however, a large majority expressed hopes of opening a new page in Yemen’s history.  The high turnout reflects the high expectations the people have of the transitional government.

Hadi was elected in a one-candidate election and received 99.6% of the votes. This process followed a power transfer deal signed last November by Saleh and the Joint Meeting Party (JMP), the opposition's main coalition. The deal was brokered by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). In this agreement, Saleh agreed to step down in exchange for immunity and both parties decided that Hadi would be the sole candidate for the presidency. A transitional government was also formed in December by the new Prime Minister Mohammed Bassendwa, divided evenly between Yemen’s ruling party and the JMP. In 2014, the end of the transitional period, both parliamentary and presidential elections will be held.

Hadi took his oath of office before parliament on February 25, putting an end to the 33-year rule of former President Ali Abdallah Saleh, who officially transferred power during the inauguration ceremony on February 27.

The 67-year old president will now have to face many challenges during his two-year interim term. These include starting a national dialogue, restructuring the security and military, and enforcing socio-economic reforms.

A national reconciliation process is of utmost urgency and requires a comprehensive dialogue with all forces and political actors, including the youth, the Southern Movement, the Houthis, other political parties, civil society representatives, and women.  Many of these main actors felt alienated during the GCC negotiations, and later, both the Southern Movement and the Houthi rebels boycotted the election.

Since its creation in 2007, the Southern Movement has been demanding socio-economic reforms in the southern regions that have been marginalized by the regime.  These demands later developed into various political claims including calls for a federal system, or an independent state.  More than 1,000 activists have been killed in the south since 2007, with thousands detained or injured. Significantly, no real dialogue has been held to resolve this issue.

Tensions in the south have been witnessed and are likely to increase if this issue is not properly addressed.  For example, on election day, armed and masked groups blocked streets in the southern city of Aden where they tried to prevent people from voting by shooting in the air or invading polling centers. Nine people were killed in the clashes between these groups and security forces. The government accused the separatists of being responsible for these attacks while leaders of the Southern Movement denied these claims.

In the northern province of Sa’ada, a stronghold of the Houthis, the population suffered six years of war between the rebels and the government forces as well as a social and economic marginalization. The Houthi movement has a central command, and a very organized and powerful following.  They have been controlling the Sa’ada governorate since last year, and have expanded to other areas.

The Southern Movement, the Houthis, and the youth, who all have strong power bases, were excluded from the negotiations of the GCC agreement and their boycott of the election was not addressed.  It is important to avoid this mistake a second time. If the government continues to alienate these powerful groups and fails to listen to their grievances, it is more likely they will not participate in the transitional period. Collective participation is the only way to give people a sense of ownership and endow the political process with real legitimacy. Holding a comprehensive dialogue with these two groups is a necessity for the transitional government in order to avoid an escalation of violence.

Another main demand of the youth which was also mentioned in the GCC deal, is the restructuring of security and military institutions.  However, the text of the agreement itself, which both the US and Saudi Arabia have strongly supported, remains vague on the issue. This is likely to have been deliberate as both countries wanted to restore stability in Yemen but may have also wanted to protect their direct interests in its institutions. The US administration has a strong relationship with the counterterrorism units in the military, headed by Saleh’s relatives. 

John Brennan, Barack Obama’s chief counterterrorism advisor, visited Yemen a few days before the election. For many Yemenis, this signifies that the “war on terror”, rather than the establishment of democracy, remains a top priority for the US.  Sending a key political advisor would have sent a different message.

In a recent interview with Reuters, Gerald M. Feierstein, the US Ambassador to Yemen, responded to a question on the restructuring of the military by stating that: "the completion of the process will [take] years because it is a fairly complicated process." Feierstein added that the US counterterrorism policy in Yemen "would continue along the lines that [they] have been pursuing." This spurred many reactions by Yemenis who have questioned whether the US administration is really committed to deep changes or might delay the needed reforms to protect its own interests. When asked in the streets who rules Yemen, many answer “Sheikh Feierstein”, highlighting the belief that if the US does not want reform, it will not happen.

If the US continues putting short term “gains” ahead of long term reform, Yemen and the international community’s security will be threatened.  The real solution to fighting militants is through deep social, economic and democratic changes, something the US and Saudi Arabia are blocking by keeping the status quo.

The catastrophic socio-economic situation has been absent from Yemen’s mainstream media coverage. Large segments of the population still lack access to basic supplies like water, electricity or fuel, while inflation keeps increasing and oil revenue is on the decline.

The international community has announced it will support Yemen’s transition by delivering a significant amount of aid to help the country recover.  However, this may not be sufficient. Fernando Carvajal, a PhD candidate and Yemen expert, explained: "If we look at the government’s budget and the impact of the uprising it is estimated [that] Yemen needs an instant influx of cash of around $3bn."

In Yemen, the poorest Arab country, more than 50% of the people live under the poverty line and 42% of children are malnourished according to the World Food Program.  Corruption is endemic and Transparency International listed the country among the ten worst in the world. Only by taking immediate steps to support the economy and improve the standard of living will Hadi be able to fight the corruption from the bottom-up.

These are not hidden challenges, but must be addressed immediately by the new government.  With the start of the transitional period, Yemen’s new government must take this small window of opportunity to address the various challenges.  Now is the most critical moment for Yemen’s future and will decide whether the country will move forward or regress.

The hope for Yemen lies in the country’s awakened population and in their ability to continue demanding deep reform beyond a change of personalities.  The watchdog groups and the transformation of some youth groups into new political parties are an indication of the type of protests to come.

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.