The escalation by in April — has led to new direct talks between US President Joe Biden and his counterpart, . The biggest fear in the West is whether intends to invade . The leadership has claimed that its more than 100,000 troops deployed along borders are on territory, are conducting routine training and should not worry anyone.military buildup along borders conducted over the last few months — similar to an
Russia’s Actions Threaten OSCE Legitimacy
In stark contrast,perceives the potential deployment of NATO troops close to its borders as a major security threat. This reveals that understands very well the signals it is sending by amassing an unprecedented-in-size military strike group to Ukraine’s frontiers. There is solid evidence that is engaging in a bold brinkmanship game over , using the logic of threat to create strategic ambiguity about a potential military invasion. Its goal is to force Western concessions on , in particular, and to obtain a strategic carte blanche in the post-Soviet area more generally.
The Logic of Threats
Following a videoconference on December 7 between Biden and Putin, the argued that, unless Putin’s demand for guarantees that will never join NATO is accepted, the would see a military defeat of , which would be “an especially humiliating re-run of recent events in Afghanistan.” Another expert hinted that, unless the US ensures that implements the version of the Minsk agreements, it may risk a war in .leadership sent a number of signals that created more clarity about the Kremlin’s intentions. Their form was accurately reflected in a few analyzes published by the -based Carnegie Moscow Center. One analyst
The stating that if NATO refuses Russia’s right to veto the alliance’s further expansion to the East, it will risk “serious consequences” and would lead to “its own weakened security.”foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov, confirmed that the West should accept these two conditions if it wants to avoid Europe returning to “the nightmare scenario of a military confrontation.” Following the teleconference, the deputy foreign minister, Sergey Ryabkov, reiterated the idea,
These are the most direct and bold threats that the Kremlin has issued against the West since the collapse of the Soviet Union. There are strong signals that this brinkmanship overis a strategic calculation, triggered by the Kremlin’s perception that both the European Union and the are irresolute.
For instance, in his November 18 address to foreign policy officials, Putin observed thathas managed to create a feeling of tension in the West. He went on to recommend that this state of tension “should be maintained for as long as possible” and exploited to demand “serious, long-term guarantees” to prevent NATO membership for and Georgia.
Following Putin’s videoconference with Biden, theforeign ministry published its concrete demands for talks on a new European security order. Among these demands, requested that NATO withdraw its 2008 Bucharest summit “open doors” pledge for and Georgia.
Assessing the Risk of War
Why isso bold to directly threaten war and confront the West with an ultimatum: either accept a war in Europe or give up the post-Soviet area? The Kremlin has concluded that there is little appetite in the West to confront on , beyond economic sanctions.
Russia’s leadership has also come to believe that the West is extremely risk-averse and not ready to call the Kremlin’s bluff. The brazenness of the threats, the reference to NATO’s “humiliation” in Afghanistan and interviews withand foreign experts confirming the strategic timidity of the West — all of this speak to that. For instance, in an interview with Harvard’s Timothy Colton in the newspaper Izvestia during the recent “Valday Club” conference, the reporters emphasized the idea that is not important to the US. In an interview with the former US ambassador to , Michael McFaul, the journalists of the Echo Moskvy radio station pointed out that “we sell the Americans their own fears.”
Under the current conditions, the risk of a massive conventionalinvasion of is very small. is not yet ready for a total break up with the West, similar to the one the USSR had, which would be very likely if it attacked . Therefore, the question of whether is going to attack is not helpful for strategic planning. Instead, for a more effective engagement of , the and the US should ask: What actions, short of giving up Ukraine’s sovereignty, should be taken to decrease the risk of war?
Responding to Russia’s Threats
There are three strategic objectives that the European Union and theshould pursue and strengthen. They all stem from an effective crisis diplomacy rationale. First, it is necessary to signal a strong resolve to impose high costs on where it is vulnerable. Second, it is necessary to make these signals credible. Third, it has to engage in intensive diplomacy to show that Russia’s demands are not linked to its actual security concerns.
The biggest vulnerability ofis the high military costs of an invasion. Providing defense equipment to , deploying instructors and even small military units for joint exercises with troops in the vicinity of the line of contact in Donbas and near Crimea — on a rotational basis — would serve as a passive obstruction to potential attacks. These are the most effective deterrence tools, which would greatly strengthen the credibility of the resolve of the and the US from Russia’s outlook.
Finally, theand the US should confront Russia’s manipulation of the “indivisible security” concept, which is a major element of its international propaganda campaign. To counter Russia’s legalistic approach and hidden agenda, they should suggest and discuss alternative proposals, such as the pact of non-aggression or parity of forces in the border areas. The West should not ignore that its response to threat of war is likely to affect how other international actors — China, for example — view its resolve in responding to comparable challenges in other regions.
*[This article was originally published by the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), which advises the German government and Bundestag on all questions related to foreign and security policy.]
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
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