In October, Argentine President Javier Milei and his party, La Libertad Avanza (LLA), achieved a crucial victory in the midterm elections, which renewed one-third of the seats in Congress. Milei, who took office in 2023, saw his party win nearly 41% of the vote, an outcome that serves as the first national test of his popularity.

The election results have drastically altered the legislative landscape, significantly strengthening Milei’s position. LLA secured 13 of the 24 contested Senate seats and 64 of the 127 lower-house seats. This marks a substantial gain, as before the elections, his party held only six Senate seats and 30 seats in the lower house. Although it does not hold an outright majority, the LLA is now the most powerful minority bloc in Congress.

These gains are relevant because his prior reform program, characterized by radical spending cuts and deregulation, faced various political obstacles, including opposition lawmakers who overturned his vetoes of bills to increase funding for state universities, people with disabilities and children’s healthcare.

The enhanced representation in Congress will make it easier for Milei to push ahead with his controversial program to slash state spending and deregulate the economy. Financial markets rallied following Milei’s victory, seeing it as a sign that his political survival has kept his economic experiment — and crucial US support — alive. With stronger congressional support, he is likely to implement more radical changes ahead of the 2027 presidential election.

The context of Milei’s endorsement

Milei’s victory in the midterms came two years into his presidency. Radical spending cuts and free-market reforms have defined his administration. He pledged to shrink state spending by taking a metaphorical “chainsaw” to it, and has since cut budgets for education, pensions, health, infrastructure and subsidies, in addition to laying off tens of thousands of public-sector workers.

The support for Milei, even amidst the painful austerity, is rooted in a deep dissatisfaction with previous governments and a desire for an end to decades of economic mismanagement.

The midterm election result shows that many Argentines remain unwilling to return to the Peronist model (which called for the state to take a leading role in the economy to ensure cooperation between businesses and labor). Milei blames this model for the country’s long history of economic woes. Before Milei took office, inflation had hit triple figures annually, and the country was experiencing a profound economic crisis.

Supporters, including US President Donald Trump, credit Milei with taming inflation, cutting the deficit and restoring investor confidence. The elections were significantly marked by the intervention of Trump, who, in a late-September social media post, publicly conditioned a promised $40 billion US financial lifeline for Argentina on Milei maintaining political momentum and winning the elections. This threat, wielded against a precarious and heavily indebted economy, served as a powerful form of political intervention through financial pressure.

Voters’ apathy helped Milei’s political coalition. The turnout for the election was 67.9%, the lowest in a national election in decades, suggesting widespread apathy toward politicians across the spectrum. Some voters — hardcore Milei libertarians, swing voters seeking stability and anti-Peronist urban professionals — backed Milei reluctantly, believing the country is on the right path to the desired economic stability. 

The painful price of austerity

Milei’s favorable midterm election, however, is not a universal endorsement of his policies, which have come at a heavy cost. Critics argue that the price of his austerity has been high with social hardship, rising debt and threats of cuts in essential services. 

Retirees, people with disabilities and young people are particularly affected by the pension cuts and job losses that Milei’s austerity has inflicted. With budget cuts, the public services, among the best in Latin America, are crumbling.

Concerns exist that essential funding laws for people with disabilities, which Milei previously vetoed, could again be “in danger” with his strengthened position. The vetoes of bills boosting funding for state universities and children’s healthcare have also been contentious. Despite the promise of “financial freedom,” household debt for daily necessities is at a record high, with nine out of ten Argentine families taking on debt to cover basic necessities. In 2021, this scenario was milder, with seven out of ten experiencing financial stress.

The question going forward is whether the general population will start to feel better off, or if the ongoing pain of some of his budget cuts will test people’s patience once more. For now, an important proportion of voters have shown they are prepared to give him more time.

Weak opposition

In the midterm election, the Peronists, the left-leaning group that dominated national politics in Argentina since the country’s democratization in the 1980s, under the electoral coalition Fuerza Patria (FP), failed to enlarge their congressional seats in both houses. With almost 34% of the total votes, FP maintained the same number of seats in the Senate, nine seats in total, and reduced their presence in the lower house by three seats, holding a total of 47 seats.

This electoral failure followed a resounding Peronist victory in Buenos Aires’ provincial legislature election in September, where FP won roughly 47% of the vote. This optimistic result for FP proved misleading; metropolitan Buenos Aires, the largest electoral college in the country with 17.5 million voters, does not reflect the national mood. In effect, Milei’s rise to power comes from his large support from the countryside and other provinces such as Cordoba and Santa Fe.

FP’s difficulty in resonating with the wide variety of voters in Argentina outside Buenos Aires has weakened the coalition’s opposition to Milei in Congress. With their legislative power diminished, the Peronists’ primary opposition to Milei will now likely shift decisively from Congress to the streets, setting the stage for a period of heightened social conflict alongside radical legislative change.

Known for its mobilizing capacity, Peronists will likely exert further pressure on Milei by organizing protests and strikes. They have already been doing this, but until now, the main opposition was exercised by blocking or striking down Milei’s legislative actions.

A deepening democratic erosion

Milei won because voters prefer painful liberalization to a return to failed Peronist governance, and because international financial pressure and political fragmentation helped sustain his political coalition. But this choice comes at a high price: the acceleration of democratic erosion.

According to the V-Dem Institute, Argentina has suffered a long-term erosion of democratic checks and balances, with legislative and judicial constraints on the executive weakening since the early 2000s — a decline that began under prior Peronist administrations. Under Milei, however, this trend has sharply accelerated, marked by severe declines in executive oversight and respect for constitutional norms.

His renewed electoral mandate is likely to deepen this deterioration, further strengthening the presidency at the expense of other institutions and hastening the decline of judicial independence and democratic accountability.

This congressional empowerment also arrives as Milei faces a critical test of institutional integrity: serious allegations that his sister and Chief of Staff, Karina Milei, received kickbacks from a pharmaceutical company. In a climate where economic outcomes dominate political conversations, such ethical dimensions risk being overshadowed, signaling how public institutions can be captured by private interests and deepening the process of democratic decline.

In the current scenario, the 2027 election appears favorable to Milei’s reelection. His radical discourse, disregard for institutional checks and close alignment with Donald Trump strengthen his position against any opposition candidate. If his austerity program succeeds in delivering economic stability, a significant share of Argentines seems willing to tolerate it — even at the cost of further democratic erosion.

[Kaitlyn Diana edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.