As the general officer commanding the Kargil Sector, I remember standing on the 13620 ridge in December 2012, overlooking the Line of Control (LoC) with Pakistan, feeling the wind bite through the high-altitude cold and realizing that what we faced was not simply a military opponent. I realized then that we faced a doctrine that came from an institutional mindset forged over decades.

Pakistan’s army does not fight for the moment; it fights for continuity.

Over years of operational service — Uri in 1983, Siachen in 1984 and many more times on the LoC — I came to understand that the enemy’s approach was never impulsive. Each infiltration, each raid, each proxy operation was part of a calculated strategy, designed to perpetuate friction and extract maximum advantage with minimal direct risk.

American political scientist and professor Christine Fair has captured this institutional logic succinctly: “For the Pakistan Army, simply retaining the ability to challenge India is victory. To acquiesce is tantamount to eroding the legitimacy of the Pakistani state”. Standing on the ridge, I understood what she meant: the army’s focus is less about conquering territory than about maintaining the perpetual war posture, the option to continue conflict indefinitely.

Origins of a permanent conflict

The seeds of Pakistan’s strategic posture were sown in the trauma of 1947. The Partition of India (the division of British India into India and Pakistan) left a country preoccupied with survival, acutely conscious of its size, geography and neighbors. 

The first Kashmir War reinforced the perception of India as an existential threat, while the 1971 debacle — the loss of East Pakistan, which is now the independent nation of Bangladesh — instilled a permanent mistrust of civilian leadership. As a soldier observing these developments, it became clear that Pakistan’s army had internalized the lesson: political weakness in the country must never compromise military primacy.

The doctrine of “strategic depth” emerged from this context. It was not merely about geography; it was about institutional survival. The army positioned itself as the guarantor of national survival, irrespective of constitutional norms. General Zia-ul-Haq in the 1980s institutionalized this approach further by combining Islamization with proxy strategies in Kashmir and Afghanistan, creating a template for controlled irregular warfare that persists today.

As Fair notes: “Even though Pakistan has failed to make even modest progress toward attaining Kashmir, its revisionist goals toward India have actually increased rather than retracted in scope”.

From my operational perspective, this has meant facing opponents whose strategy is predictable in principle but adaptable in execution, relying on low-cost, deniable instruments to achieve disproportionate political leverage.

The doctrine of controlled instability

Pakistan’s strategic design vis-à-vis India operates along several mutually reinforcing axes. First, it maintains credible nuclear deterrence. Second, it employs proxy warfare through nonstate actors and militias to impose high costs on India without provoking a full-scale war. Third, it uses psychological operations to cultivate a narrative of Indian aggression, reinforcing domestic legitimacy for Pakistan’s army.

Historically, this model was evident in Kargil (1999), the Mumbai attacks (2008), Pulwama (2019) and Pahalgam (2025). Each episode served multiple objectives: signaling capability, extracting diplomatic leverage and justifying domestic military dominance. The underlying principle is the stability–instability paradox: nuclear deterrence prevents all-out war while enabling continued low-intensity conflict. 

As Fair emphasizes, “Because the army defines defeat in terms of being unable to mount a challenge to India … the army will prefer to take risks than to do nothing at all, which is synonymous with defeat”.

On the ground, I repeatedly witnessed the operational manifestation of this doctrine. Patrols would intercept enemy infiltration teams who were lightly armed yet trained for psychological as well as tactical effect. Every cross-border raid was a calculated gamble, designed to impose maximum strategic confusion with minimal cost.

The US connection and the China alliance

Pakistan’s strategic calculus extends beyond India. Since the Cold War, Pakistan’s army has leveraged its relationship with the US to enhance its capabilities while retaining autonomy in critical decisions. During the Afghan Jihad, the US funded conventional buildup and intelligence expansion. In the post-9/11 era, Pakistan maintained counterterrorism cooperation while simultaneously nurturing proxies in Kashmir and Afghanistan. 

This duality ensures strategic flexibility: Pakistan’s army can align with Washington on select initiatives while continuing to work on its own long-term strategic objectives. It also makes Pakistan uniquely dangerous.

Parallel to its engagement with the US, Pakistan’s army has cultivated a deep partnership with China. From the 1960s onward, China provided advanced weaponry, training and diplomatic cover to Pakistan. The China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) exemplifies the material and strategic interdependence between Beijing and Rawalpindi, the general headquarters of Pakistan’s army. Yet this alliance is instrumental and cautious. Pakistan extracts maximum advantage while managing dependency risks.

As I observed in the study of various joint exercises and intelligence assessments, Chinese advisers prioritize operational discipline, while the Pakistan Army leverages these partnerships to sustain its asymmetric approach against India. Unlike Pakistan, China is a responsible actor, calculated in its pursuit of influence, wary of internal instability and far less willing to risk economic or military overreach.

The logic of perpetual war and its costs

The persistence of Pakistan’s strategy rests on a central logic: perpetual war preserves institutional authority. Proxy networks, psychological operations and cross-border raids sustain attention and diplomatic leverage disproportionate to the resources expended. In Kashmir, for instance, Pakistan’s army ensures that any negotiation or ceasefire is always accompanied by episodic escalation, reinforcing its indispensability in the domestic narrative.

From my vantage point on the field, I could see this calculus in every patrol, infiltration attempt and cross-border firing. Rawalpindi’s objective was not a decisive victory but continuous friction. As Fair puts it: “Pakistan’s conflict with India cannot be reduced simply to resolving the Kashmir dispute. Its problems with India are much more capacious than the territorial conflict over Kashmir”.

Reliance on irregular warfare carries high internal costs. Blowback from militant networks threatens domestic security, economic growth is undermined and international credibility suffers. Civil-military tensions occasionally erupt, as politicians attempt to reclaim autonomy from an army entrenched in the state apparatus.

Yet Pakistan’s army manages these contradictions with remarkable resilience, prioritizing institutional continuity over immediate stability. In operational terms, this means that even when local insurgencies or economic shocks occur, the army maintains a strategic posture, a testament to the depth of its planning and adaptability.

India’s security dilemma, managing both Pakistan and China

India has long borders with both Pakistan and China. Delhi faces a grave danger if it neglects India’s western border with Pakistan when pouring resources into its northern border with China. From years of counterinsurgency operations and border patrols, I can say with certainty that Pakistan’s army counts on India’s divided attention. India must maintain credible deterrence, which involves integrating intelligence, conventional forces and rapid-response capabilities across multiple domains.

While India often frames China as a potential “enemy number one,” operational experience suggests otherwise. Beijing pursues strategic influence through economic and institutional leverage, unlike Rawalpindi, which actively destabilizes to maintain relevance. China’s behavior is predictable, disciplined and fundamentally transactional. By contrast, Pakistan’s pursuit of perpetual conflict is ideologically and institutionally driven, creating enduring volatility.

As a soldier, I would caution against conflating these two very different threats. Pakistan is the immediate, persistent hazard. China is a long-term, disciplined competitor. Strategic planning must reflect this distinction.

[Shokin Chauhan first published a version of this piece on Substack.]

[Kaitlyn Diana edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.