As European nations seek to rearm their militaries, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen argues, “We must buy more European because that means strengthening the European defense, technological and industrial base. That means stimulating innovation.” Nonetheless, EU Member States continue to purchase the majority of their arms from abroad, primarily from the US, opting for “off the shelf” technology already on the market.

The problem is that this tendency continues reliance on arms controlled by foreign governments, hinders the development of European-made products and, as many have found, means very long wait times.   

Last September, Lockheed Martin received the largest order of Patriot missile defense interceptors in the company’s history. For a whopping $9.8 billion, the US Army signed a multiyear procurement contract for 1,970 PAC-3 MSE missiles designed to intercept ballistic and cruise missiles, aircraft and hypersonic threats. Major General Frank Lozano, Program Executive Office Missiles and Space, says signing a contract extending to 2026 enables “the Army to procure a larger quantity of missiles for more rapid delivery, thus filling our inventory faster.”  

Lockheed has sped up production to fill this order, but non-American customers should be worried — especially European countries, as the continent races to increase the EU’s defense capabilities with the growing threat from Russia. The US foreign military oversees the sales of such technology and can divert defense goods at will. 

Switzerland learned this in July when US officials told them that the five Patriot systems they ordered from Raytheon in 2022 would now be going to Ukraine, with the new delivery date unknown. The wait might be long, as Germany just agreed to buy two new Patriots ($1 billion apiece) to donate to Ukraine in exchange for getting priority for the production of new systems. 

Countries that source off-the-shelf products from outside Europe, mainly from the United States, justify this by claiming that it is faster. But this position is clearly an obstacle to the development of sovereign European solutions, and the argument of availability, as Switzerland has learned, is not bulletproof.

Hindering EU projects

Returning to von der Leyen’s argument, one of the main problems with EU Member States supplying armies with non-EU products is that it threatens European defense projects under development and lowers demand for products already available, thus reducing production rates and increasing prices. This perpetuates a cycle of dependence on foreign industry and foreign governments. 

As countries rapidly seek to build air defense capabilities, the Patriot system illustrates this conundrum. As Germany and Switzerland place orders and EU countries buy them for Ukraine, Denmark recently announced that it has instead selected its European equivalent, the SAMP/T NG air defense system from the EUROSAM joint venture between MBDA and Thales. Equipped with the Aster family of missiles, which was recently used in combat, the system has just received an upgrade with a successful live-fire test. 

Given the US Army’s recent order for Patriot missiles, the off-the-shelf argument for buying the Patriot system was problematic. Prior to Denmark’s decision, Danish defense analyst Hans Peter Michaelsen claimed, “I expect Denmark to choose European, partly because it will ensure faster delivery. There is an enormous queue for the Patriot missile system. It would also be a strong signal from Denmark that we support the European defense industry, which needs to ramp up.” 

Moreover, the value-for-money argument was essential. The Patriot and SAMP/T systems have almost identical uses, capabilities and tested success rates, with the European system outperforming in some areas. But the SAMP/T costs a third less than the Patriot. Following Denmark’s decision, Danish Defense Minister Troels Lund Poulsen concluded, “This is not a rejection of Patriot, it is a selection of what is best.”

The Ukrainian/Russian conflict also highlights the need for EU Member States to equip themselves with deep precision strike arms capable of medium- and long-range hits. To this end, MBDA is developing its Land Cruise Missile (LCM) as “part of an effort to establish a sovereign European capability for ground-based precision strike systems”. Based on the battle-tested MdCN (Missile de Croisière Naval), LCM is expected to be tested between 2027 and 2028 and is considered a potential component for the multinational European Long-Range Strike Approach (ELSA) initiative. 

However, several EU countries are considering solutions outside Europe. The Netherlands is purchasing nearly 200 Tomahawks of various versions for its surface vessels, and Germany is currently negotiating buying American Typhon systems equipped with Raytheon-produced Tomahawk missiles, arguing that this option will be quicker. However, the lack of orders from the US government in recent years has resulted in a reduction in production capacity, leading to longer delivery times. 

Missile specialist Fabian Hoffmann observes, “Unsurprisingly, US Navy Justification Books list a total lead time of 2.5 to 3 years for newly ordered Tomahawks. Germany would also face competition for building slots with US-based and foreign customers and would initially be placed at the back of the queue.” 

The problem is not just with US defense companies. The $246 million purchase of Starliner drones that Switzerland ordered from Israel’s Elbit Systems in 2015, with an expected delivery date of 2019, has still not all arrived. In 2023, the company “decided to focus its production capacities on the war effort against Gaza, postponing delivery to the end of 2026”. And the ones that have been delivered do not work as advertised. Legal action has been filed, but if Bern pulls out of the deal, they lose 300 million francs and risk counterclaims from Elbit. 

Denmark also had a problem with an Elbit delivery when the country ordered 19 ATMOS 2000 self-propelled guns and eight PULS rocket launchers. When Denmark donated 19 of its Caesar artillery systems to Ukraine, it was expected that Ukraine would reorder from the French manufacturer Nexter, but Denmark instead purchased from Israel, claiming it would be quicker. “Now Danish officials regret the decision” because the systems they ordered are incompatible with their IT systems and will take three times longer than expected to integrate. Plus, the Danish Armed Forces do not have the associated ammunition and infrastructure, which could cost them an additional billion kroner. 

No strings attached

Another problem with buying armaments from abroad is that countries are not autonomous regarding when/if they can be used. Ukraine learned this the hard way as its army was restricted from using missiles in its arsenal to counterattack Russia, despite being pummelled by Russian missiles. 

The New York Times reports, “The United States, Britain and France have provided small batches of ballistic and cruise missiles, but their use is restricted so that they cannot be used to strike major Russian cities like Moscow.” Ukraine has therefore funneled money into developing its own deep strike cruise missiles, no strings attached. 

Ultimately, urgently filling strategic gaps through off-the-shelf purchases may be legitimate, provided that these acquisitions meet all the strategic objectives pursued. The aim is therefore to stock European shelves with European products that meet the need, strengthening both European armed forces and European industries. 

The Bruegel think tank deems this feasible: “development cycles can accelerate substantially in moments of dramatic increases in defense spending and reprioritization of defense, while production costs should fall substantially … Europe thus has a chance to rearm and reduce its dependence on the US within the requisite timeframe, but only if it can undertake major reform of both the demand and the supply side of the defense market in Europe”. The focus should then be on creating enough demand for the EU industrial base to be able to become Europe’s sole defense provider. 

(Elliott Frey edited this piece)

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.