After almost six years, Pakistan crossed a red line by staging a brutal massacre in Pahalgam, killing 26 civilians. Pakistan has again used its old playbook of escalating grey zone warfare beyond agreed red lines. Pakistan must realize that these tactics offer little deterrent value against India.

Pakistan’s delusion of crossing red lines

Pakistan’s grey zone war tactics have been driven by internal security and military dynamics Pakistan uses sub-conventional warfare to destabilize Kashmir and fuel Islamic fundamentalism in India. While religious radicalization has gained traction, destabilization efforts in Kashmir have weakened over the past year. Pakistan’s fixation on Kashmir is compounded by rising sectarianism, fundamentalism and the threat from Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISIS-KP).

Internal security failures have damaged the Pakistan Army’s credibility. Chief of Army Staff Asim Munir, who faces internal challenges, has pushed anti-India rhetoric and escalated grey warfare beyond previous limits.

Obsession with crossing red lines

Escalation tactics serve three purposes for Pakistan: disrupting India’s rising strategic profile, reviving terror networks in Kashmir and boosting army morale by fueling anti-India sentiment. A fourth goal — coercive deterrence — has lost relevance since India abandoned strategic restraint.

Pakistan’s military leadership, particularly Munir, misreads today’s strategic realities. Their escalatory tactics now rest on delusion rather than sound strategy.

The delusion

Pakistan’s escalatory tactics brought tactical gains decades ago. After the Kargil War, the Lashkar-e-Taiba staged the Chittisinghpura massacre in 2000, killing 35 Sikhs on the eve of US President Bill Clinton’s visit to India. Clinton shifted US policy toward closer ties with India, marking the beginning of a major strategic realignment.

Meanwhile, Pakistan’s internal crises multiplied. Terror attacks increased and economic problems deepened. The Pakistan Army’s popularity hit a low point. Pakistan’s Army responded by using terror to maintain strategic relevance.

In 2001, Pakistan faced even greater pressure following the 9/11 attacks. The Lashkar-e-Jhangvi carried out the Bahawalpur church shooting. Around the same time, Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee toured Russia, the UK and the US to strengthen strategic ties. US Secretary of State Colin Powell threatened Pakistan with devastation if it did not cooperate against the Taliban. Under immense pressure on its western front, Pakistan again escalated tensions through the Indian Parliament attack, prompting Operation Parakram.

These incidents show a consistent pattern: Pakistan seeks to derail India’s rise and avoid isolation through escalatory violence. Iran pursued a similar strategy during the October 7 attacks, hoping to offset strategic isolation caused by the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) initiative.

Both Pakistan and Iran miscalculated. Tactical gains came at the cost of long-term strategic isolation. Pakistan’s Kargil misadventure strained its US relations and gave India diplomatic momentum. This history shows that Pakistan’s efforts to coerce India through escalatory tactics have had diminishing returns and now yield almost no strategic gain.

India’s strike-back options: rethinking deterrence

India must recognize that limited punitive strikes — such as the Balakot air strikes in 2019 — offer only temporary deterrence. Pakistan responded to Balakot with an airspace violation, signaling that surgical strikes alone are insufficient.

India must adopt a sustainable deterrence model that maximizes pressure on Pakistan and achieves operational impunity. India should shift to an octopus doctrine: attacking the strategic leadership and infrastructure behind terror operations, not just individual terror groups. This strategy mirrors Israel’s recent efforts against the axis of resistance.

India has two operational paths: covert targeted killings of high-profile terror leaders or overt military actions. Both options would raise the costs for Pakistan’s sponsorship of terrorism.

Internally, India must also improve counterinsurgency operations. A “search and destroy” strategy, modeled after successful British tactics during the Malayan Emergency and adapted for Kashmir’s terrain, can dismantle terror cells like the Resistance Front (TRF). Troops would insert into hostile territory, locate enemy targets, attack and swiftly withdraw, based on actionable intelligence.

By rethinking deterrence now, India can push Pakistan closer to strategic marginalization and better secure its national interests.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.