After almost two weeks of the Pahalgam massacre, India launched cross-border strikes with precision and depth. According to a press release under Operation Sindoor, the Indian military targeted nine terror camps and headquarters of Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Taiba in Pakistan and Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (PoK). India showed its strong will to strike back, but this time the strategic message extended beyond punishment.

The strike-back patterns

Until now, India’s strike-back pattern showed punitive deterrence with a limited hitting range. The 2016 Uri strikes and 2019 Balakot strikes demonstrated India’s ability to enforce punitive deterrence against Pakistan by signaling that any hostile action would face a swift and severe response. After the 2001 Indian Parliament attacks, India launched Operation Parakram to signal punitive deterrence. However, over time, this approach lost effectiveness. Pakistan developed a perception that India’s deterrence posture had a limited range and could be countered.

Pakistan demonstrated this perception during Operation Swift Retort. A day after the Balakot strikes, the Pakistan Air Force breached Indian airspace using JF-17s and attempted air strikes on non-military targets in Jammu and Kashmir. The escalation remained largely controlled, but the broader goal of deterrence weakened. Both countries relied on punitive deterrence, reducing its credibility. Pakistan continued its terror operations in Jammu and Kashmir and refined its sub-conventional tactics. It created offshoots and front organizations like The Resistance Front to maintain plausible deniability.

The call for strong offensive deterrence appeared in former Chief of Army Staff General Krishnaswamy Sundarji’s vision paper, India’s Army Perspective Plan 2000. He argued that India must adopt maximized offensive deterrence, including seizure of territory and destruction of Pakistan’s military and economic capabilities. General Sundararajan Padmanabhan, who oversaw Operation Parakram, similarly said, “Perpetrator would be punished so severely that its continuation thereafter in any form would be in doubt.” Both generals supported credible deterrence against Pakistan. Their vision was not just to punish Pakistan but to erode its sub-conventional warfare capability through sustained offensive actions, such as those demonstrated in Operation Sindoor.

Swift shift

Operation Sindoor demonstrated three key shifts from earlier strike patterns. First, India expanded its strike horizon by hitting targets deep inside Pakistan, including the cities of Bahawalpur and Muridke. Second, it increased operational selectivity by targeting multiple locations rather than just one or two camps. Third, India attempted to apply multi-domain deterrence.

A few days after the attack, India executed a five-point diplomatic offensive. It included reconsidering the Indus Waters Treaty and isolating Pakistan diplomatically and economically. India aimed to apply a double squeeze strategy — exploiting Pakistan’s internal weaknesses while isolating it on the global stage. The miserable failure of Pakistan at a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) closed-door meeting, despite reviving its long-standing narrative of a “false flag” attack, is one testament of strategic isolation. India’s earlier diplomatic approaches showed modest results, but this time India applied extraordinary diplomatic measures to support multi-domain deterrence.

India’s strategic response demonstrated its capability to impose sustained, credible, and multi-dimensional deterrence. Operation Sindoor signals a shift from immediate deterrence to long-term credible deterrence. This new deterrence posture could push Pakistan to the margins if India continues to strike the leadership of terror networks with precision. Operation Sindoor suggests that India is moving toward integrated deterrence. This resembles the shift in US strategic thinking after the September 11 attacks, when the US Department of Defense began refining integrated deterrence in response to threats from Russia and China.

Escalation problem and Pakistan’s response

The threat of escalation remains a major risk in the India–Pakistan retaliation cycle. This risk increases when Pakistan’s leadership tilts toward Islamist military figures such as former President Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, former President Pervez Musharraf, former Chief of Army Staff Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, and current Chief of Army Staff Asim Munir. India has stated that its actions are calculated, precise, and non-escalatory, targeting only terrorists. Pakistan, however, has often responded with border provocations and nuclear threats.

After India’s thunderbolt response, Pakistan’s top leadership may now hesitate. The burden of escalation lies with Pakistan. Last year, Pakistan carried out limited air strikes after Iran targeted anti-Iran groups in Pakistan’s border region. Pakistan may again choose limited air or cross-border strikes. Currently, it is using indiscriminate shelling in Jammu and Kashmir. Poonch is one of the worst-hit areas.

Whatever the response, Munir faces high costs. Pakistan already suffers strategic and reputational damage. If Munir miscalculates, then the escalation ladder might spiral, and he might get consumed by his own fire. Pakistan cannot afford to further jeopardize its strategic security, especially as it faces growing pressure on its western front from Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan and Baloch insurgents. Pakistan must now consider that coercion against India carries greater risks and costs. India has shown that it will respond with both power and resolve.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.