The Indian subcontinent is undergoing profound political, economic and ideological churns. Afghanistan has returned to Taliban rule, Pakistan is trapped in economic collapse and civil–military dysfunction, Bangladesh is plummeting into Islamist mobilization, Nepal, Sri Lanka and the Maldives are facing political and economic fragility, and Myanmar’s junta is involved in civil war. These developments directly affect India’s internal security, border stability, trade routes and regional influence. Yet, the Indian response is reactive and episodic.

Nowhere is this strategic incoherence more evident than in India’s approach toward the Taliban. The radical militia of the Taliban captured Kabul in August 2021, and India immediately pulled its diplomats out and closed its mission. In contrast, the mastermind of the Taliban movement, Pakistan, was elated. Subsequently, Indian diplomats realized that they had given Pakistan a carte blanche (blank check) on the Afghan affairs. The last time Pakistan got the better of India in Afghanistan was post-Afghan Jihad in 1989, and it led to a dramatic increase in militants entering Jammu and Kashmir. Therefore, to avoid history repeating itself, Indian diplomats are trying to build a working understanding with the Taliban.

However, engagement does not require legitimization. Giving a highly media-driven welcome to Afghanistan Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi and allowing him to visit Deoband seminary does not advance any articulated strategic purpose. This approach demonstrates that tactical changes have overtaken strategic planning.

At the same time, Bangladesh has plunged into radicalism, directly affecting long-term Indian interests. The interim government, inadvertently or advertently, has given ideological and operational space to the Jammat-e-Islami and Hizbut-Tahrir Bangladesh (HTB) in the state. Multiple reports even suggest that Pakistani intelligence is looking to knit an alliance with extremists in Bangladesh. The results are turning out to be horrific, with radicalism pervading society, the economy is depreciating and social tensions, with Hindus being specially targeted, are reaching acute stress.

In such a situation, one expects a coherent Indian response. However, the Indian solution to this anarchy is anything but coherent. The policies are made on a case-by-case basis, untethered by any overarching architecture of grand strategy.

The necessity of the National Security Strategy

This malaise of incoherence is largely due to the absence of a National Security Strategy (NSS). In the absence of a guiding philosophy that defines national interests, threats and priorities, India’s response is fragmented and erratic. Although the National Security Council (NSC) decided to begin work on the NSS in 2018, it is not yet ready. The secretary of the NSC is the National Security Advisor (NSA); thus, the NSA was tasked with its formulation.

This delay is especially consequential given the scale of global change since 2018. The great-power competition is rapidly intensifying. Military technology is advancing on an alarming scale. New domains of warfare, such as cyber and space, are expanding the scope of threat perception by altering recruitment and training. And within all these changes, the regional stability in the subcontinent is plummeting. In such an environment, an NSS becomes a necessity.

However, what is an NSS, and why is it indispensable? These questions are foundational to grasping the essence of an NSS. An NSS is fundamentally a political-strategic document that integrates the military, diplomacy, the economy and technology. From a realist perspective, it brings multiple elements of state power together to reduce vulnerability in an anarchic system where the distribution of power drives conflict.

An NSS consists of two parts: one confidential, for top-ranking serving officers, and the other declassified, for scholars and thinkers. The declassified part succinctly presents a nation’s view on the prevailing balance of power and international politics. It presents an assessment of the present. The NSS also lists a nation’s interests in the external world. It tells us which region, ocean and sea are most critical for its trade. It also informs us about the status quo from military and political perspectives in the trade-critical regions. Finally, once the interests are clearly defined, it outlines ways to protect them. The means can vary depending on the comprehensive national power. As the power increases, the ways to influence others to your way change. These are the three basic elements of an NSS.

Threat perception, relative power symmetry, economic power shifts, technology and its military applications are constantly changing. Thus, a timely revision of the NSS is necessary. This revision helps a nation to face the new threats with strategic clarity.  

In this sense, the NSS is the very core of a state’s security architecture. Much like the Preamble of a constitution, it lays the normative and strategic foundation for a much grander scheme to secure interests. This document is the driving force in the functioning of the most important elements of state power. Yet, India does not have it. This strategic amnesia is costing Indian national security dearly. 

What follows the NSS: the National War Doctrine

The immediate doctrinal corollary for the military is the National War Doctrine (NWD). The NWD articulates the way the military will fight the next war. It is the brain and guiding philosophy for the military. This study defines how the military conceptualizes warfighting. It translates the national interests defined in the NSS into military concepts and operational preparedness.

Once this comprehensive assessment is done, the military moves to building capability and increasing capacity. Hence, it is the NWD that decides the approach to warfare. So, whether the military chooses an Integrated approach in the form of joint theater commands with integration across domains such as cyber, electronics and space, or fights as individual services, is decided solely by the NWD. Therefore, implementing such an approach is the final step in planning. Surprisingly, implementation is occurring first in our case, driven by the theaterization of commands. 

It is not just theaterization but also changes in recruitment patterns, new doctrines for Special Forces and Cyber Domains, and the raising of new battalions that are happening. Meanwhile, both the Special Forces (SF) doctrine and the Cyberspace doctrine, and the operationalization of the Joint Armed Forces Special Operations Division (AFSOD) in 2019, are welcome additions. But the underlying fact remains that this should ideally be done after we have defined our interests and areas of interest broadly. Such an exercise will be more impactful in utilizing the special forces and exploiting the cyber domain.

For instance, numerous SF veterans have written that our SFs are engaged in counterinsurgency operations in Jammu & Kashmir, even though such operations can easily be carried out by the Ghatak platoons of any infantry battalion. The veterans are of the opinion that SF must primarily be used to achieve strategic objectives. 

Given such a haphazard state of affairs, the former Chief of Army Staff (COAS), General MM Naravane, stated in 2022 that talking about theaterization before having the NSS is akin to “putting a cart before the horse”. Thus, implementing such reforms without doctrinal clarity risks fixing the military in a misaligned organizational setup. Such a scenario will not bode well for the country nor the military.

The way forward

If India intends to claim its long-lost seat among the great powers, then having the NSS is the first step. This will set the tone for India’s engagement with the rest of the world. It will give much-needed clarity and usher in economic and military reforms on the basis of long-term objectives. It will save Indians from pursuing ill-defined aims.

However, the NSS is not a panacea. It is not a substitute for bureaucratic, economic and political reforms. But it is the foundation, over which the state’s capabilities can be built and strengthened. Thus, the immediate task for the NSC is to frame the NSS and list out the Indian interests, threats and ways to deal with them clearly.

[Kaitlyn Diana edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.