Venezuela’s trajectory shifted abruptly in the early hours of January 3, when the country’s president, Nicolás Maduro — who had long been the Chavista regime’s great survivor — was captured by US forces. Maduro, along with his wife Cilia Flores, was brought in front of a federal court in Manhattan, where he pleaded not guilty to the four weapons and narco-terrorism charges against him.

What analyst Andres Izarra had described as a poker match in which Donald Trump held a weak hand due to his proclivity to bluff has suddenly turned into a geopolitical chess game. It is still unclear whether the special operations team that seized Maduro acted solely on local intelligence or whether betrayal at the top levels of government played a role. What is clear is that Maduro’s fall is no minor development — Venezuela has entered an entirely new phase. Leaders must navigate this time of unpredictability and avoid the fog of war if they wish to secure Venezuela’s future.

Maduro’s capture marks a new era

Regarding the legal grounds for capturing the active president of a sovereign country — independently of him having lost a presidential election — two angles are worth mentioning. From a strictly US perspective, Maduro was indicted in 2020 in a court of law on charges of helping to transport cocaine and working with narco-terrorist organizations. The charges against him are reminiscent of others, such as El Chapo and the former military leader of Panama, Manuel Noriega, who had also been captured by US forces back in 1998. Therefore, in the US’s view, there is legal precedent and just cause for Maduro’s capture.

From an international perspective, the capture of Maduro infringes basic tenets of international law. The world we live in today has seemingly changed abruptly from the one inherited after World War II, especially after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. UN Secretary General António Guterres said that US actions “constitute a dangerous precedent.” However, the UN cannot pass resolutions against the US for its recent actions because of the veto power the US holds in the UN Security Council. Today, the United Nations architecture is at its weakest since its inception.

Within Venezuela’s borders, politicians are also responding to the actions of the US. María Corina Machado, the 2025 Nobel Peace Prize winner, has declared that this moment marks the beginning of a new era. She continues to insist that under Edmundo González Urrutia  — opposition leader and winner of the 2024 Venezuelan election — the democratic movement is prepared to govern. Her confidence may prove overly optimistic, or it may signal a pledge to play a more direct role in shaping the transition ahead. Either way, her responsibility, and Venezuela’s at large, is unmistakable: to defend the popular will expressed during the July 28, 2024, elections, and to assert the democratic leadership’s claim to govern.

For now, however, the crisis is a two-player confrontation between the remains of the Chavista elite and the Trump administration. The Nobel Peace Prize recently awarded to Machado in Oslo was a global acknowledgment of the democratic movement’s legitimacy. It is a recognition that Washington has yet to fully embrace, aside from the occasional sotto voce recognition and a 2025 endorsement from Secretary of State Marco Rubio. US President Donald Trump has even suggested that Machado doesn’t have the “respect” of the Venezuelan public. 

Only when the fog of war lifts will it be possible to discern the real role the democratic forces will play. What is certain is that there is no clear return to the status quo ante. What comes next is unknown, and both Venezuela and the US must choose their paths carefully. 

Two scenarios are emerging

The first, more cautious scenario involves negotiating with Delcy Rodríguez, Maduro’s successor, to reach an arrangement that might unlock large-scale U.S. investment in Venezuela’s oil sector. But most American energy companies remain unwilling to invest in a country where property rights and basic legal guarantees are absent. The Chávez years already demonstrated the risks: expropriations without compensation that helped drive the collapse of the oil industry.

Even if democratic leaders keep being sidelined from these negotiations, González Urrutia and Machado retain overwhelming popular support from the Venezuelan public — expressed unequivocally in 2024 and never withdrawn. Despite imprisonment, exile and clandestine life of the vast majority of its leadership, Venezuelans continue to back them. Under such conditions, a Rodríguez government would face pressure from the public to make internal concessions, especially now that it is weakened by the capture of its main leader. That includes releasing more than 1,000 political prisoners detained by the Chavista regime, creating conditions for a more open polity or agreeing to new elections. 

The second scenario is what Trump has called the “second wave”: another military action aimed at dismantling what remains of the dictatorship. Such a move would inevitably force Washington to engage with Machado and González. They possess the internal political legitimacy to govern and the credibility to negotiate with institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF), as well as the credibility to offer partial amnesty to the military, security forces and government officials that are not involved in high crimes. Overall, Trump’s suggestion that the United States would govern Venezuela is not taken seriously even within his own circle. 

Legitimate leadership must fill the power vacuum in Venezuela

Intermediate outcomes — or a combination of the above — are possible. This includes some form of Chavista regime survival under conditions like those prevailing today, though that scenario doesn’t seem highly likely. Firstly, if Maduro’s capture resulted to some extent from being double-crossed by part of the regime’s leadership, this surely has created a rarefied environment at the top not amenable to internal stability and cohesion. 

Secondly, as mentioned by both Trump and Secretary Rubio, economic pressure will continue. Venezuela’s inflation for 2025 was nearly 270% and it could potentially reach 680% in 2026. This will compromise any attempt at normalizing economic life in the country, as well as responding to the demands of the Trump administration to propel the oil industry to higher production levels. As everyone knows, the oil industry in Venezuela — exploration, drilling and refining — is near total collapse, as well as the electrical and other infrastructure allowing it to improve productive capacity. 

Finally, as widely documented, the Chavista leadership elite — known as the bolibourgeoisie — has amassed vast fortunes. It seems likely that, given the growing internal uncertainty, some of its top figures (and their families, who enjoy the comforts of capitalism) will seek to protect their assets and salvage what they can.

The path ahead will be difficult: Chavismo still controls the military, security forces, the judiciary and regional governments. Rebuilding the country will require a series of partial negotiations with each of these power centers, as well as transitional justice measures for those not implicated in serious crimes. Venezuela has entered a period of profound uncertainty, and the chess match has only just begun. As the fog of war and competing narratives begin to clear, the facts will surface — and with them, the direction of the wind that will shape the country’s future.

[El Pais first published this piece.]

[Cheyenne Torres edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.