An analysis of the reasons for Algeria’s silent absence from the Arab Spring and the great changes sweeping the region today.

The Arab Spring has caused great turbulence, with popular demonstrations shaking the foundations of many regimes across the Middle East and North Africa, thus challenging the very way in which the region has been ruled for decades.

Algeria, however, has remained largely quiet during this time. Indeed, Algeria has steadfastly remained out of the Arab Spring limelight, defying speculation that the regional unrest would deeply affect it. This is rather surprising, given that Algeria is ripe for revolution, especially because of its long history of political upheaval and popular demonstrations and its widespread hatred of le pouvoir (the moniker for the Algerian regime), as well as its current youth unemployment of 20% and critically weak private sector.

Despite these afflictions, Algeria has seen neither major protests nor suffered the fate of neighbouring Libya or Tunisia. It has not proposed the major constitutional changes, such as those of King Mohammed VI in Morocco, nor been forced into a change of political leader like Egypt. Indeed, Algeria is maintaining a long springtime silence during this time of widespread change.

Memories of the Algerian Civil War

There are deep historical reasons that explain why change in Algeria, especially when driven by popular demonstrations, is not enthusiastically embraced. These reasons are deeply rooted in the events of the 1980s and 1990s. The oil crash of 1986, during which the price per barrel dropped from $30 to $10 and forced deep governmental budget cuts, led to popular demonstrations in October of 1988, which then led the country’s youth to demand reform of an inflexible and antiquated regime. The unprecedented scale of unrest was so extensive that President Chadli Benjedid put forth key reforms, including multiparty parliamentary elections.

However, in the ensuing elections of December 1990, the Front Islamique du Salut (F.I.S), an Islamist party, won 48% of the vote. To avert certain political catastrophe, a panicked regime and military swiftly instigated a coup d’état, banning the F.I.S. and starting a bloody and indiscriminate Civil War, which raged for 10 years and caused the deaths of 200,000 Algerians.

As a result, Algerians have traumatic memories of the consequences of protests and demands for reform, as well as direct knowledge of the unpleasant consequences of failed revolutions. This is not to say that an Arab Spring in Algeria will automatically deteriorate into a vicious civil war; however, for many Algerians now largely living in peace, the risk of a return to violence is simply too much to bear.

Additionally, after considering Algeria’s historical background, and the consequences of the Arab Spring in Libya, Egypt, and Syria, it is unsurprising that few Algerians are willing to participate. In Libya, Algerians have watched as large-scale public demonstrations and protests turned to bloodshed, civil strife, and disunity. The casualties and destruction of infrastructure is enough to remind many Algerians of their own nation’s recent past. Libyan chaos and strife implies that the choice for many in Algeria is not necessarily one of democracy versus autocracy, but rather of strife versus security and stability.

The Economic Impact

By comparison, the events in Egypt and Tunisia, although less destabilising, have still entailed the near-collapse of their national economies—something that has not been ignored in Algeria. According to the Council for Arab Economic Unity, the Arab Spring has cost the regional economy $100bn already; with the Geopolicity group stating that the ongoing unrest in Syria has cost its economy over $27bn thus far (made up of $6bn loss to GDP and $21bn loss of state revenue) .

Algeria’s very weak private sector explains why its citizens potentially put their own economic stability before their desire for political change. In addition, the potential key to Algeria’s silence is arguably in part due to popular fear of a scenario in which the regime does not cede to the demands of demonstrators, thus evolving into civil strife and a collapse of a vulnerable economy.

This fear of economic shock may at first glance seem to be a rather simplistic argument, but for a population suffering from unemployment and poor socio-economic prospects, it is not unreasonable to expect a vast majority to be keen to retain stability over political change. Algeria is a rentier state, deriving the majority of its economic output from oil production. In 2011, oil derived income is set to reach 60% of total budget revenues and 30% of total GDP. Consequently, Algeria is highly vulnerable to tides of economic disruption arising from potential street protests. Although located in the Sahara desert, such protests could disrupt oil production facilities, leading to great loss of income.

This occurred in Libya earlier this year, with the country losing the quasi-entirety of its oil output, a key element in the collapse of the regime. The Algerian government has always feared losing its oil. The rise in prices have led to a minor boom for oil revenue, which has boosted income to over $40bn, dwarfing the $2bn accrued from non-oil based exports. Losing this, even temporarily, would undoubtedly cripple the regime.

The Repressive Nature of the State